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PROPOSAL FOR LINKING CULPABILITY AND CAUSATION TO
ENSURE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR Toxic RISKS
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY*
Less than a week before this Symposium convened, The Washington
Post reported that a prominent international drug company had arranged
during the late 1990s to test an exceedingly profitable drug in human
beings for effectiveness in treating Hepatitis B.' Although the initial
results were promising, the principle investigator, Hong Kong virologist
Dr. Nancy Leung, discovered that patients taking the drug for more than
one year became infected by a highly pathogenic mutant virus that
appeared to cause liver failure. She reported that the treatment may have
resulted in the death of one subject. The company, however, belittled her
concerns and continued to publish over her name an "upbeat" scientific
abstract that did not mention her concerns. 2 The company also provided
Dr. Leung with slides for a presentation at an international scientific
meeting that portrayed her research in a misleading fashion. The Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") approved the drug in 1998 based upon one-
year's worth of results from research conducted by Leung and others.
When an FDA investigator visited Dr. Leung's laboratory during a pre-
approval investigation, the company provided a report that contained no
reference to the dead patient that Dr. Leung had mentioned in her original
report, an omission that was later discovered only because Dr. Leung's
hospital provided the investigator with an unaltered version of her full
report.
3
Although it is too early to gauge the FDA's reaction to this very
recent revelation, it is entirely possible, indeed probable, that the drug will
remain on the market (perhaps with an additional side-effect warning) and
that many cases of fatal liver failure will result from the mutant viruses.
W. James Kronzer Chair in Trial and Appellate Advocacy, University of Texas School
of Law.
IDeborah Nelson, Drug Giant's Spin May Obscure Risk, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2001, at
A14.
2 Seeid.
See id.
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Should the heirs of one of the victims sue the company responsible for
marketing the drug, their attorneys will face an uphill battle in proving that
the victim's liver failure was caused by a mutant virus that resulted from
the plaintiffs treatment with the defendant's drug. After all, persons
suffering from Hepatitis B frequently suffer liver failure, and no one
knows for sure whether the mutant virus actually causes liver failure. The
most that some future epidemiological study can say with confidence is
that it appears that more patients with Hepatitis B who take the drug suffer
from liver failure than similarly situated patients who do not take the drug.
Depending upon the power of the statistical analysis suggesting an
association between the drug and the increased incidence of liver failure, it
may be difficult for a plaintiff to find an attorney willing to invest the
considerable time and resources required to bring such a lawsuit against a
drug company anxious to protect its hundred-million-dollar-a-year
product. If attempts to sue the manufacturer therefore fail and if, as is
likely, the FDA does not take any punitive action against the company,
then the company will have avoided all responsibility for reprehensible
conduct that at the very least put patients at risk. The company might be
held accountable in corporate heaven, but not down here on earth.
Let me begin with a controversial assessment and a debatable
prediction, neither of which will I attempt to support empirically in this
article. My assessment of the past twenty years of developing toxic tort
law is that any realistic threat of a "liability crisis" 5 ended years ago with
the widespread adoption of tort reform legislation in state legislatures,
careful screening by White House and Justice Department officials of
prospective federal judges for their views on "judicial activism" with
respect to judicially imposed constraints on business enterprises, 6 and the
pervasive airing of tort liability "horror stories" in the media. Highly
publicized, but largely unwarranted claims that the common law courts
and federal regulatory agencies (the two primary governmental institutions
for ensuring corporate accountability for health and environmental risks)
4The task of providing an empirical basis for the assumptions made in this article is the
task of a larger work in progress to which future events will provide additional support.
5 For assertions that a "liability crisis" was overwhelming corporate America and the
insurance industry, see MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION
MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS 136 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990) (alluding to the "emerging
product liability crisis"); see also George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
6 See SHARON BUCCINO ET AL., HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: How ACTIVIST JUDGES
THREATEN OUR AIR, WATER, AND LAND (2001).
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were relying too heavily upon "junk science" brought about changes in
both of those institutions that have caused them to be far more cautious
about regulating and imposing liability upon business entities. This
reticence on the part of existing constraining institutions came at a time of
booming economic expansion and rapid technological developments
(especially in the areas of pharmaceutical and agricultural technologies)
that had a significant potential to do great harm to human health and the
environment. My prediction is that these developments will precipitate an
"accountability crisis" that will begin to intrude upon the public
consciousness in the coming years as stories of unpunished corporate
malfeasance, like the one above, appear in the media on a regular basis.7
If my assessment and prediction are wrong, then the law of toxic
torts as administered by the federal courts and most state courts is moving
in roughly the right direction. Stiff limitations on the admissibility of
scientific evidence in toxic torts lawsuits were badly needed to keep the
liability crisis from overwhelming vital American producers and to keep
American companies competitive in a robust global economy. The courts
must continue to demand that scientific expert testimony meets clear
threshold demonstrations of scientific validity and proper litigative fit to
put the world on notice that judges will not tolerate attempts by uninjured
plaintiffs and greedy trial lawyers to use the tort regime to punish
corporations for conduct that federal and state regulatory agencies are fully
capable of addressing.
In short, the reader who is convinced that the Daubert line of cases
in the Supreme Court brought much needed balance to the law of toxic
torts, whether legitimately or not, may stop reading here. This article does
not challenge Daubert's legitimacy. Others have persuasively argued that
the Supreme Court, in the Daubert line of cases, displayed a woeful
misunderstanding of science and scientific values, subtly usurped
substantive state tort law in derogation of the Erie doctrine, and snatched
away the jury's fact-finding power in full view of the Seventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution.8 My criticism of the Daubert line of
7 Others have concluded that the existing tort and regulatory regimes are failing. See,
e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117 (1997) ("Under our current system,
the process of guarding against risk and unraveling uncertainty is impeded because
corporations often disregard the development and dissemination of critical information
despite the supposed inducements provided by both regulation and toxic tort litigation.").
8 See generally id. (arguing that the substantive law governing toxic torts should be
recast); Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of
2001]
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cases is that its comforting message to corporate America that companies
will not be held liable in tort for damages they did not clearly cause will be
heard by at least some companies as an invitation to press the limits of
corporate responsibility. The recently exposed tobacco documents reveal
with startling clarity how potential toxic tort defendants can "bend
science" to meet their litigative and public relations needs. That capacity
and the general inability of resource-strained regulatory agencies to
uncover and punish illegitimate attempts to manipulate the regulatory
process will combine to produce an accountability crisis that will
ultimately precipitate strong political demands to change the system.
This article offers, perhaps somewhat prematurely, a partial solution
to the impending accountability crisis that combines the institutional
strengths of courts and regulatory agencies while at the same time sending
a message to American companies that irresponsible manipulation of
scientific information in the regulatory process will not go unnoticed and
unpunished. This article proposes a combined administrative/litigative
approach that links causation to culpability by applying various
culpability-based presumptions to the conclusions of a federal agency
charged with assessing scientific evidence that is reasonably reliable in the
agency's policy-informed exercise of scientific judgment.
The political momentum appears at the moment to be moving rather
powerfully in the opposite direction. But the momentum will shift in the
not-too-distant future as we realize that a global economy with few
effective health and environmental protections is a frightening place. If I
am correct in predicting that an impending accountability crisis will
provide a political setting in which far-reaching changes in the existing
tort regime are legitimately on the table, the relatively modest changes
suggested here may forestall more aggressive changes aimed at shifting the
burden of proof altogether, 9 or replacing the common law with a full-
fledged administrative reparations regime.'
0
Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047 (1999) (focusing on the
troubling scientific issues and discussing the failures of Daubert); Lucinda M. Finley,
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 335 (1999)
(exploring substantive law implications in the wake of Daubert); Michael A. Gottesman,
From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 753
(1998) (tracing the Supreme Court's "erratic course" in addressing whether federal judges
may bar scientific testimony).
9See Berger, supra note 7.
10See Richard A. Nagareda, Future Mass Tort Claims and the Rule-Making/Adjudication
Distinction, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1781 (2000) (alluding to "an emerging consensus, as
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I. CAUSATION AS A HURDLE IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION
Fifteen years ago, as the phrase "toxic tort" was first entering the
trial lawyers' lexicon, they were optimistic that the common law would
prove an effective vehicle for compensating persons injured by exposure
to toxic substances, for exacting retribution against those who callously
exposed innocent people to toxic risks, and for sending a message to
companies that pollution had a steep price that could be avoided only by
limiting polluting activities.'" One of the earliest practitioners of the
newly emerging discipline predicted that "[c]hanges in laws to lessen the
victim's causation burden are making it easier for plaintiffs to recover in
toxic-tort cases."'12 Another pioneer of toxic tort litigation argued that
judicial recognition of claims based upon the new science of "clinical
manifested by the actual behavior of attorneys on the front lines of mass tort litigation, as
to the desirability of developing private administrative systems for the handling of future
mass tort claims").
I I mean to incorporate within the rubric of "toxic torts" claims for compensation from
persons who allege that they have been injured by virtue of an exposure to a substance or
product for which the defendant is responsible. I acknowledge that this includes a large
number of claims that may have little in common beyond the critical element of exposure
to an allegedly toxic substance. See E. Donald Elliott, Causation and Financial
Compensation: Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation
Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1369 (1985) (noting that the "toxics problem" is not a single
problem, but many problems that may have little in common). The institutional solution
should be broadly applicable to a wide range of toxic torts involving exposures to
products, drugs, and environmental contaminants. Nonetheless, it will probably not be
necessary to address acute toxicity easily attributable to a single source (e.g., Bhopal),
and it will not be useful in some contexts, such as the environmental contaminant that
originates from thousands of sources. See id. at 1370-71. The discussion here is aimed
primarily at the middle range of toxic exposures in which the primary evidence of cause-
in-fact comes from epidemiological studies and animal studies.
12 Paul D. Rheingold, New Frontiers in Causation and Damages, TRIAL, Oct. 1986, at
42-44. Rheingold mentioned recent holdings allowing claims for enhanced risk, mental
distress resulting from fear of contracting disease, bodily changes, medical monitoring,
and property damage as examples of courts reducing causation barriers. Id. In
subsequent years, the courts have not been at all receptive to claims for increased risk or
for mental distress unaccompanied by any physical injury caused by the toxic insult.
Plaintiffs have successfully pursued medical monitoring claims in a few cases, and claims
for property damage directly caused by polluting activities have also met with some
success. Overall, however, the anticipated changes have not come about.
20011
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ecology" would "substantially increase opportunities for victims to recover
for their injuries."'' 3
Time has not borne out those rosy projections. The courts have
repeatedly rejected attempts to sidestep the traditional "but for" cause-in-
fact showing in toxic tort litigation. In retrospect, causation has proven a
very effective stumbling block that has not only precluded compensation
for all but the most clearly understood environmentally caused diseases,
but has also stood in the way of ambitious attempts to protect the public
health generally through toxic tort litigation. Jonathan Haar's widely read
account of the Woburn litigation painted a stark, but accurate picture of the
enormous difficulties that a plaintiff's attorney faces in attempting to
recover damages for physical harm caused by exposure to environmental
contaminants. 1'
4
As plaintiffs lawyers moved beyond mesothelioma and other
"signature diseases" for which exposure to a single substance was clearly
the dominant among possible causes, potential defendants and their trade
associations began to worry in a serious way about the potential that the
common law of torts had to effect profound changes in the way they did
business.15 Business groups and conservative foundations created "scores
of coalitions and task forces,"' 16 including the American Tort Reform
Association, and funded academic research aimed at limiting "lawsuit
abuse."'17 Manhattan Institute Fellow Peter Huber wrote a well-publicized
polemic entitled "Gallileo's Revenge," in which he argued that plaintiffs'
claims of causal association between exposures to toxic substances and
13 Anthony Z. Roisman, Proving Cause in Toxic-Tort Litigation, TRIAL, Oct. 1986, at 59-
60.
14 See JONATHAN HAAR, A CIVIL ACTION (First Vintage Books 1996); see also Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992).
15See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1995).
16 Maxwell Glen, Congress Joins the Hue and Cry Over Liability Insurance Crisis, 18
NAT'L J. 380 (1986).
17See Burt Solomon, Finger-Pointing Distinguishes Attempts To Fix Blame for Liability
Crisis, 18 NAT'L J. 378 (1986) (identifying the American Tort Reform Association as "a
coalition of policyholders assembled last month to lobby for changes in tort law"). The
American Tort Reform Association gradually evolved into a fully funded American Tort
Reform Foundation. See Letter from Sherman Joyce, American Tort Reform Foundation,
to "Professor" (Dec. 11, 1998) (on file with author).
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disease were frequently based upon "junk science." 18  Although the
empirical basis for these criticisms was never convincingly established, 19
Vice President Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness drafted fifty
proposals for reforming the civil justice system, six of which related to
tightening judicial scrutiny of scientific expert testimony.20  The overtly
political purpose of the proposed reforms was to enhance the
18 PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); see
W. John Moore, Free-Lance Critic Hits Shackles of Regulation, NAT'L J. 2797 (1986)
(counsel for Products Liability Alliance refers to Huber's work as "the intellectual
underpinning" of the tort reform effort of the mid-1980s).
19 Professor Huber's mostly anecdotal accounts were heavily relied upon by the tort
reformers, but were harshly reviewed by academics and practitioners. See Robert F.
Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44
ARK. L. REv. 629 (1991); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM.
U. L. REv. 1637 (1993); John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive
Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1071, 1076-77 (2000) (contrasting Huber's praise of the common law with Huber's
criticism of the common law); Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the
Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 186 (1993) (book review).
Reacting to the widespread criticism of the way courts and juries were treating
scientific evidence, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government
conducted a multi-year examination of that topic through a task force that included
prominent members of the scientific community, as well as the bench and bar. CARNEGIE
COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES (1993) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT ON JUDICIAL
DECISIONMAKING]. The task force's report, published just before the Supreme Court
issued its Daubert opinion, took a much less pessimistic view of the ability of courts and
juries to cope with the complex scientific issues that arise in toxic tort litigation. It
pointed out that "many of the criticisms directed at the operation of our court system
arise-quite understandably-from misperceptions about the differing methodologies and
goals of science and law, and from the consequent failure to comprehend the diverse roles
and expertise of 'judge,' 'juror,' and 'scientist."' id. at 12. While the Carnegie
Commission may have been correct in concluding that the existing court system was not
broken, this Article takes the position that the federal judiciary's rather extreme response
to the criticism, signaled by Daubert/Joiner, has contributed to a crisis of accountability
that does call for institutional change. See generally id.
20 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 11, 21-22 (1991), reprinted in Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
America, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 979 (1992). The Vice President's tort reform initiative
relied heavily upon Huber's analysis of the failings of the tort regime. See Chesebro,
supra note 19, at 1645.
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competitiveness of U.S. companies in global markets by relieving them
from the threat of expensive and occasionally ruinous civil liability.
2
The Daubert case gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to
examine the "junk science" issue in a critical legal context-determining
the admissibility of expert testimony.22  Because nearly all causation
claims in toxic tort litigation necessarily rest on expert testimony,23 one
way to ensure the validity of such claims and, incidentally, to reduce the
incidence of successful lawsuits is to raise the bar on admissibility of
expert testimony. Unlike the Quayle Commission's tort reform initiative,
which precipitated a loud political debate and ultimately failed,24 the
Supreme Court could stem the daunting flow of resource-intensive toxic
tort lawsuits through a politically invisible interpretation of the words
"scientific" and "knowledge" in the obscure Federal Rules of Evidence.
Many observers believe that this is exactly what the Court had in mind in
the Daubert line of cases. 2
5
Prior to Daubert, defendants had in several cases successfully
persuaded courts to raise the bar of admissibility to the Frye "general
acceptance in the scientific community" standard.26 The Supreme Court in
Daubert declined to employ that test, but it nevertheless raised the bar by
interpreting Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to require the
district judge to perform a "gatekeeper" role in determining the
admissibility of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"
21 See Dan Quayle, Protecting America's Greatness, WASH. POST WKLY. REP., Dec. 16-
22, 1991, at 29. See also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 19-22
(1996).
22 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Joseph Sanders,
Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1387,
1389 (1994) (suggesting that the "emerging belief that an increase in 'junk science' in the
courtroom requires greater judicial vigilance in admitting expert opinion" fueled a sense
of emergency that persuaded the Supreme Court to examine the role of expert testimony
in toxic torts cases twenty years after the Federal Rules of Evidence had been adopted).
23 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1063.
24 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Bumbling on Billions, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 86; see also
Quayle's Crusade, 17 NAT'L J. 344 (1992); Owen Ullmann, President Quayle,
WASHINGTONIAN, Sept. 1992, at 68.
25 See Finley, supra note 8, at 335, pt. III; see also Gottesman, supra note 8, at 756-59.
26 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Peter A. Bell, Strict Scrutiny
of Scientific Evidence: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, BNA SAFETY AND LIAB. REP.
47 (1992). See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.
1991) (noting that the court affirmed grant of defendant's motion of summary judgment
on ground that plaintiff's causation expert not admissible).
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under Rule 702.27 Henceforth, the trial judge would have to determine
whether offered expert testimony was "relevant and reliable" before
allowing the jury to consider that testimony, and the reliability of scientific
proof was to be determined by reference to its "scientific validity" when
measured against the methods and procedures of science.28 Although the
Court gave the district judges some guidance,29 the ultimate test remained
quite subjective.
By rejecting the Frye rule in civil cases, the Daubert opinion could
have reversed a growing trend in the lower courts toward strict judicial
scrutiny of expert testimony in toxic tort cases. 30 Many early observers
believed, however, that Daubert invited the lower courts to play an even
more aggressive role in evaluating the "scientific validity" of expert
testimony in cases involving toxic causation.31 The terse and ambiguous
guidance that the Court provided could have allowed the law to evolve in
either direction. 32 But the Court's elaboration on the Daubert criteria in
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,33 where it clarified the trial judge's role of
27 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
28 Id. at 590; see also sources cited supra note 8.
29 The Court suggested several factors that should bear on the trial judge's inquiry. First,
the judge should ask whether the scientific proposition can be tested through scientific
methods. Second, the judge should consider whether the evidence has been subject to
peer review. Third, the judge should take into account the "known or potential rate of
error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation." Finally, the court should consider the extent to which the information is
accepted in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
30 Some early commentators were convinced that Daubert would result in greater
opportunities for juries to evaluate scientific evidence in toxic tort cases. See, e.g.,
Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15
CARDOZO L. Rav. 1945 (1994); see also Kenneth Chesebro, Taking Daubert's "Focus"
Seriously: The Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDoZO L. REv. 1745 (1994).
31 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139 (1994); see also Robert F.
Blomquist, The Dangers of "General Observations" on Expert Scientific Testimony: A
Comment on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 KY. L.J. 703, 719 (1993-
94).
32 David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientfic Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on
the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661,
663-64 (2000) (noting that "Daubert contained considerable language to support the view
that more, rather than less, expert testimony might be the result of the opinion"). For
critiques of the Court's guidance in Daubert and Joiner, see Beecher-Monas, supra note
8, at 1051-62; and Sanders, supra note 22, at 1391-92.
33 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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ensuring that the scientific testimony "fit" the judge's view of the relevant
issues of the case, had the foreseeable affect of nudging the lower courts
toward the strict scrutiny end of the spectrum. 34  Dicta in the Joiner
opinion suggesting that the trial court was obliged to evaluate the
"scientific validity" of an expert's conclusions, as well as the data and
methodology that the expert employed, accelerated an already existing
trend in the lower courts toward aggressive judicial scrutiny of plaintiffs'
expert testimony.35  Finally, Rule 702 has recently been amended to
incorporate the Daubert/Joiner tests.36
It is now clear after almost a decade's experience with Daubert that
the lower courts have applied it quite vigorously to exclude expert
testimony.37 Because the plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of proof in tort
litigation, this aggressive invocation of the judge's new role as guardian of
the purity of scientific evidence has had a disproportionate impact on
plaintiffs. With remarkable speed, judges have gone far beyond throwing
the clinical ecologists out of the courtroom. 38 They are now excluding the
34 The actual holding of Joiner was that the courts of appeals should not review district
court applications of Daubert to exclude scientific testimony with any greater scrutiny
that other evidentiary rulings.
35 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. See also D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What
Has Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Wrought?, 29 BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 329 (2001)
(arguing that as a result of Daubert/Joiner/Kumho federal trial judges now "play an active
role in deciding what expert testimony goes to the jury"). Professor Finley reads Joiner
to express "a normative judgment that judges are to be trusted more than juries (and
sometimes more than scientists) in areas where law intersects with science." Finley,
supra note 8, at 345.
36 FED. R. EvID. 702. The Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 702 was amended
"in response to" Daubert and "to the many cases applying Daubert." Id. advisory
committee's note.
37 Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: Does Daubert
Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs? 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 189, 214 (1995)
("[I]t doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that a four or five part test including
'general acceptance' as one factor will be more difficult to meet than a test based on
'general acceptance' alone"); see also Faignan, supra note 32, at 664 (concluding that
"[e]xperience soon showed, however, that Daubert had the effect of excluding a lot of
evidence that had been admitted previously"); Finley, supra note 8, at 341-42; Sanders,
supra note 14, at 391.
38 In the mid-1980s, the "science" of "clinical ecology" appeared to be the answer to the
causation conundrum for plaintiffs' attorneys. Professor Elliott described the
phenomenon as follows:
For a price, some clinical ecologists will testify that exposure to even
very small amounts of a wide range of chemicals suppresses the
immune system, thereby weakening the body's ability to ward off
[Vol. 26:1
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testimony of well-regarded experts based upon smoke screens thrown up
by artful defense counsel. 39 A plaintiffs attorney must come to court
prepared not only to establish the expert's qualifications, but also to
demonstrate to a skeptical trial judge that the testimony forms
scientifically reliable conclusions based upon reliable data and that those
conclusions "fit" the legal requirements for establishing cause-in-fact. 40 If
the plaintiffs attorney fails, everyone goes home and no one knows
whether the plaintiff was a victim of cruel fate or the defendant's possibly
unconscionable conduct. If the plaintiffs attorney succeeds, the judge and
a jury must sit through days of confusing and conflicting expert testimony
at the end of which the jury may-still decide that the plaintiffs attorney did
not sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof.
The analysis that follows of the burdens plaintiffs' attorneys face in
establishing cause-in-fact in all but the very rare cases of "signature
diseases" should demonstrate that the common law, as currently
implemented by trial judges in a post-Daubert/Joiner world, is incapable
of providing adequate compensation to those injured by toxic products and
environmental contaminants. Consequently, the tort reparations regime is
incapable of punishing culpable behavior or of creating adequate
incentives to protect potential victims of toxic risks in the future. The
causation hurdle as presently administered allows far too many
"blameworthy, but fortunate" defendants, in Richard Nagareda's
memorable phrase,4' to avoid both punishment and their social obligation
to compensate the victims of their culpable conduct.
disease. This weakening, in turn, allegedly makes the plaintiff
vulnerable to virtually all diseases known to humankind, including
'nervousness,' 'malaise,' and other conditions that present only
subjective symptoms.
E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure. Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REv. 487 (1989). See also Peter Huber, Comment, A
Comment On Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches For Regulating
Scientific Evidence ByE. Donald Elliott, 69 B.U. L. REv. 513, 515 (1989).
39 For an excellent example, see Professor Beecher-Monas' thorough and devastating
critique of the Eighth Circuit's post-Daubert opinion in Wright v. Willamette Industries,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996). Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual
Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1637 (2000).
40 See Harvey Brown, Eight Gates For Expert Witnesses, 36 Hous. L. REv. 743 (1999)
(detailing eight "gates" through which the proponent of expert testimony must navigate in
order to demonstrate that the testimony is admissible).
41 Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96
MICH. L. Rnv. 1121 (1998).
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A. Proof of Causation in Toxic Torts Cases After Daubert/Joiner
The plaintiff in a common law toxic tort action must plead and prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was responsible for
his or her exposure to a toxic substance and that the exposure was a cause-
in-fact of damage to the plaintiff.42 Although plaintiffs have attempted to
finesse the causation issue by attempting to recover for risk alone or by
alleging unique forms of damage, like mental distress, increased need for
medical monitoring, and immune system disruption, the courts have
generally been hesitant to accept such novel claims.43 The essential toxic
tort claim remains an action for physical disease or injury caused by the
42
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263
(5th ed. 1984); see also Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the Door to the
Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental
Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1289, 1302 (1999). Two possible exceptions to
the requirement that a plaintiff establish a cause-in-fact relationship between exposure to
a defendant's toxic substance and a particular damage are toxic batteries and toxic
trespasses. For both of these claims, damage is generally not a necessary element. Most
courts do not recognize a toxic trespass claim for pollution, but instead require plaintiffs
to bring their claims in nuisance. In Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 709
P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985), the court recognized a toxic trespass claim, but required the
plaintiffs to show damage.
3 See Metro-North Commuter Railroad v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 432 (1997) (observing
that "[w]ith only a few exceptions, common-law courts have denied recovery to those who
... are disease and symptom free"); see also Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts,
46 VAND. L. REv. 1, 64 (1993) (courts slow to adopt recovery for risk); Andrew R. Klein,
A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1173 (1999)
(Courts "have not favored enhanced risk claims, and have placed significant barriers in
front of those who have filed such actions."); Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1797 (noting
that "[m]ost [jurisdictions] . . . do not permit exposed-but-as-yet-unimpaired persons to
sue").
The one innovation that appears to have met with some success is recovery of
medical monitoring expenses. See, e.g., Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F.
Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
See generally Brennan, supra, at 68 (collecting cases).
A few courts have allowed recovery when the plaintiff can prove to a "reasonable
medical certainty" that future harm will result from a past exposure, especially when
causation has been established for other physical injuries. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781
F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); see also Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox,
481 So. 2d 517, 519-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Daubert has unquestionably had an
impact on this theory, however, as it becomes more difficult for the plaintiffs to qualify an
expert who is prepared to testify "to a reasonable medical" certainty that the plaintiff will
suffer a disease in the future.
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plaintiffs exposure to a substance for which the defendant was legally
responsible.
The plaintiff must establish both "general causation" and "specific
causation."" To establish general causation, the plaintiff must prove that
human exposure to the toxic agent at issue is capable of causing or
exacerbating an identifiable disease from which the plaintiff suffers. To
establish specific causation, the plaintiff must prove that his or her
exposure to the toxic material caused the plaintiffs particular affliction.45
The first showing generally requires scientific data in the nature of
epidemiological studies demonstrating a statistical association between
exposure to the substance and an increase in the incidence of the plaintiffs
disease.46 The second showing typically requires direct or expert
testimony regarding the extent to which the plaintiff was exposed to the
toxic agent at issue, and some courts require additional expert testimony to
the effect that the particular plaintiffs particular affliction was more likely
than not caused by the plaintiff's exposure to the substance at issue.47
1. A Brief Primer on Epidemiology
When regulatory agencies are deciding how stringently they will
regulate human exposure to toxic agents, they first attempt to assess the
risks posed by the agent. Risk assessment is an analytical process that
"uses available scientific information on the properties of an agent and its
effects in biological systems to provide an evaluation of the potential for
harm as a consequence of environmental exposure to the agent."48 Risk
assessment must be distinguished from "risk management," which consists
of the actions that individuals and regulatory agencies take to reduce or
44 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 835 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
see also Klein, supra note 43, at 1196-97; Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1130; Richard A.
Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REv. 899, 910 (1996).
45 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1787 (observing that "the defense may properly
contest the existence of specific causation (whether the particular plaintiffs disease was
caused by the defendant's product), even when general causation (the proposition that the
product is capable of causing the disease in humans) has been established").
46 See Cutler, supra note 37, at 200-01.
47See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (alluding to the "strong"
and "weak" versions of the preponderance of the evidence rule).
48 Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,963
(Apr. 23, 1996).
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eliminate the risks that human beings encounter.49 As currently conceived,
risk assessment itself consists of four more or less discrete exercises:
hazard assessment; dose response assessment; exposure assessment; and
risk characterization. 50 Of these functions, hazard identification is the
most relevant to toxic tort litigation.
Hazard assessment is "the process of determining whether exposure
to an agent can cause an increase in the incidence of a health condition." 51
Obviously, this function is quite similar, if not identical, to the general
causation determination in tort litigation. Human health hazard
assessment typically relies upon one or more of four different kinds of
information: (1) controlled human experiments; (2) epidemiological
studies; (3) animal testing studies; and (4) various studies of chemical
structure, reactivity, mutagenicity, and DNA damage and repair.52
Ordinarily, controlled human tests are the best evidence of toxicity to
humans.53  In the case of carcinogenicity, which may take decades to
manifest itself and is often fatal, ethical considerations preclude direct
human testing.54 In the case of reproductive and developmental toxicity,
human testing is inappropriate because of serious ethical questions
49See COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC
HEALTH, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 18-19 (1983) [hereinafter NAS RED BOOK]
(stating that:
[r]isk management, which is carried out by regulatory agencies under
various legislative mandates, is an agency decision-making process that
entails consideration of political, social, economic, and engineering
information with risk-related information to develop, analyze, and
compare regulatory options and to select the appropriate regulatory
response to a potential chronic health hazard).50 Id. at3.
51 See id. at 19.
52 See id. at 20 ("Four general classes of information may be used in this step:
epidemiologic data, animal-bioassay data, data on in vitro effects, and comparisons of
molecular structure."); see also Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential
Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks: Report of the Work Group on Risk Assessment, 44
Fed. Reg. 39,858 (June 26, 1979).
53Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,309(Oct. 31, 1996); Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg.
63,798, 63,809 (Dec. 5, 1991).
54 NAS RED BOOK, supra note 49, at 12 (stating "[e]thical considerations prevent
deliberate human experimentation with potentially dangerous chemicals").
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concerning the ability of the subject to consent to the testing.55 Thus, as a
practical matter, cost and ethical considerations severely limit the extent to
which controlled human studies are available for determining the toxicity
of potentially toxic agents.
5 6
The next best evidence for use in hazard assessment comes from
epidemiological studies of human exposures that occur outside the context
of a controlled experiment.57 Epidemiology is a relatively new science,
and epidemiologists have only within the last quarter-century developed
consistent definitions and prescribed evaluative criteria for
epidemiological studies.58 An epidemiological study consists of the
statistical comparison of human beings who have received a higher than
normal exposure to a particular agent with humans who have received
little or no exposure.59 The two broad types of epidemiological studies are
"cohort" studies and "case-control" studies. In cohort studies, groups of
individuals who have received high exposures to the substance being
studied are identified and compared to groups of similarly situated
individuals with low exposures to determine differences, if any, in the
occurrence of particular diseases. 60 Cohort studies can be conducted
prospectively by identifying the two cohorts in advance of the exposure
and following the groups through time or retrospectively through the use
of historical records.6' In case-control studies, groups of similarly situated
individuals with and without a particular disease are compared to
determine the extent of any differences in exposure to the substance being
55See Lainie Friedman Ross, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the
Current Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 159
(1997); see also Michael J. Loscialpo, Note, Nontherapeutic Human Research
Experiments on Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Children: Civil Rights and
Remedies, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 139 (1997).
56 KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 72 (2d ed.
1998).
57Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,297.
58 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at 4.
59 Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,972
(Apr. 23, 1996) ("The goals of cancer epidemiology are to identify differences in cancer
risk between different groups in a population or between different populations, and then
to determine the extent to which these differences in risk can be attributed causally to
s ecific exposures to exogenous or endogenous factors.").
69 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at ch. 6; see also Proposed Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,973.
61 Id. at 17,973.
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studied.62 If the group with the disease has a higher degree of exposure, a
statistical association between the exposure and the disease may exist.
The statistical power of an epidemiological study to support
conclusions about cause-effect relationships depends upon four factors:
(1) the size of the study group; (2) the level and duration of exposure; (3)
the frequency of the relevant disease outcome in the general population;
and (4) the level of excess risk to be identified.63 The confidence with
which one may draw conclusions from studies in which no adverse effects
are detected depends entirely on the power of the study to detect such
effects. 64  Unfortunately, cost considerations generally yield
epidemiological studies that are not especially powerful. Therefore, a
negative epidemiological study rarely warrants a strong conclusion that
there is no cause-effect relationship between human exposure to a
substance and disease.65
In recent years, scientists have learned how to enhance the power of
individual epidemiological studies through "meta-analysis" of the data
from several such studies. Meta-analysis is the process of statistically
combining the results of many studies dealing with similar diseases and
risk factors to yield additional information that can enhance the
epidemiologist's understanding of associations between potentially toxic
agents and their effects. 66 Many epidemiological studies (especially case-
control studies) observe only a very small number of individuals and
therefore lack sufficient power to detect modest increases in relative risk
that could be quite significant in the case of an agent to which there is
widespread human exposure. Meta-analysis allows epidemiologists to
62 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at ch. 7; see also Proposed Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,973.
63 Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,299
(Oct. 31, 1996); Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg.
63,798, 63,809 (Dec. 5, 1991).
64 Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,299.
65 Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,967
("[W]hen cancer effects are not found in an exposed human population, this information
by itself is not generally sufficient to conclude that the agent poses no carcinogenic
hazard to this or other populations of potentially exposed humans . . . because
epidemiologic studies usually have low power to detect and attribute responses.").
66 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at ch. 32; see also Proposed Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,974 ("When utilized appropriately,
meta-analysis can enhance understanding of associations between sources and their
effects that may not be apparent from examination of epidemiologic studies
individually.").
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increase the observational power of the studies by combining their
results.
67
Epidemiologists must carefully avoid bias in obtaining and analyzing
epidemiological data.68 Unfortunately, limitations in the sources of data
ordinarily available to epidemiologists provide ample opportunities for
unintended bias.69 According to the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") proposed carcinogen assessment guideline revisions:
[b]ias can arise from several sources, including
noncomparability between populations of factors such as
general health, diet, lifestyle, or geographic location;
differences in the way case and control individuals recall
past events; differences in data collection that result in
unequal ascertainment of health effects in the populations;
and unequal follow-up of individuals. 70
One especially prevalent form of bias in epidemiology is the "confounding
factor," which is a risk factor for the disease at issue that is associated with
the exposure in the population under study that is not otherwise affected
by the exposure or the disease.7' If confounding factors unrelated to the
exposure of the substance at issue can account for the observed differences
in disease rates, then it may be inappropriate to conclude that the exposure
67 In the words of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Epidemiology of
Air Pollution: "In essence, meta-analysis assumes that the results of studies can
themselves be treated as random variables with predictable distributions." COMM. ON THE
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AIR POLLUTION, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND AIR
POLLUTION (Nat'l Academy Press 1985). Meta-analysis is not appropriate, however,
when the studies being combined are not comparable or contain substantial confounding
or other biases for which the statistical analysis does not adjust. Proposed Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,974 (Meta-analysis may not be useful
"when there are substantial confounding or other biases that cannot be adjusted for in the
analysis.").
68 See generally GREEN, supra note 21, at 30-34.
69 See ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at 199 (citing one study that "listed
dozens of possible biases that can distort the estimation of an epidemiologic measure").
See also Sanders, supra note 22, at 1420-21 (explaining recall bias in cases involving
pharmaceuticals).
Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,973. See
also ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at 119-23.
71 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at 123-25; see also Proposed Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,974.
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to the substance is responsible for those differences.72 Epidemiologists
must therefore adjust the study design or the statistical analyses to reduce
or eliminate potential "confounders" as the explanation for the observed
differences.73 When complete adjustment for confounding factors is not
possible, however, it may still be possible to draw conclusions about the
ability of an agent to cause disease from the fact that multiple studies with
different potential confounders yield similar results.74
2. General Causation
As previously noted, a plaintiff in a toxic tort action has the burden
of proving that the substance for which the defendant is responsible is
capable of causing the disease from which the plaintiff suffers in a
population of human beings that includes the plaintiff. Because the
general causation issue does not involve factual evidence about the
individual plaintiff, defendants frequently raise the general causation issue
early in the development of a trial by way of motions for summary
judgment.75 The basis for the motion, which has by now become almost
boiler-plate, is that the plaintiff will present no admissible evidence on the
issue of general causation and therefore cannot sustain the burden of proof
on that issue. The motion thus requires the court to conduct a Daubert
assessment of the plaintiffs expert witnesses on general causation based
upon affidavits and deposition testimony from the experts themselves and
from the defendant's experts. In theory, the trial judge does not resolve
the conflict in testimony at this stage, but rather determines whether the
plaintiff's experts on general causation meet the Daubert/Joiner tests for
relevance and scientific reliability.
a. The Corpuscular Approach to Expert Testimony
72 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 56, at 59.
73 Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,974.
74 Id. ("If consistent increases in cancer risk are observed across a collection of studies
with different confounding factors, the inference that the agent under investigation was
the etiologic factor is strengthened, even though complete adjustment for confounding
factors cannot be made and no single study supports a strong inference.").
75 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1074 (observing that "the causation issue
frequently surfaces in the context of a dual motion challenging the admissibility of expert
testimony and moving for summary judgment").
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In the wake of Daubert and Joiner, most courts have adopted a
"corpuscular" approach to determining the admissibility of expert
testimony in toxic tort cases. Under this approach, the party offering
scientific expert testimony must establish the relevance and reliability
under the Daubert/Joiner criteria of each individual study upon which the
expert relies as well as the relevance and reliability of the expert's overall
conclusions.76 If the plaintiff fails to establish the relevance and scientific
reliability of a sufficient number of the individual studies, the trial judge
will exclude the expert's testimony and (in the absence of other relevant
and reliable expert testimony on causation) grant the defendant's motion
for summary judgment before the jury ever enters the picture. This
approach in practice places a great burden on the plaintiff to "validate"
each of the studies relied upon by the plaintiff's experts as well as to
establish the scientific reliability of their overall conclusions.
Furthermore, this approach invites defendants to focus upon flaws in the
corpuscles of data underlying the testimony, rather than upon the scientific
reliability of the expert's overall conclusions.
Epidemiological studies are exceedingly difficult to conduct in a
world in which health and mortality records are notoriously bad. Data
must frequently be drawn from human recollections and it is impossible to
control against every possible confounding factor or source of bias. As a
consequence, the conclusions of individual epidemiological studies cannot
be stated with a high degree of certainty. Indeed, the one thing that can be
said with a great deal of confidence about epidemiological studies is that
they are likely to contain flaws and potential biases. The corpuscular
approach invites parties seeking to exclude expert testimony to search
every detail of each epidemiological study for possible flaws in the
statistical analysis and to speculate at great length about potential
confounding factors and other possible sources of bias. Given the
practical impossibility of conducting a perfect epidemiological study, the
search is nearly always fruitful.
Perhaps the best example of the corpuscular approach in action is the
majority opinion in Joiner itself.77 In that case a plaintiff with well-
documented exposure to PCBs offered the testimony of two experts who
concluded that the PCB exposure had probably caused the plaintiff s small
cell lung cancer. In the process of holding that the appropriate standard of
76 See id. at 1057, 1067 (noting that the courts have frequently read Daubert to require
them to evaluate each study underlying an expert's conclusion sequentially to determine
admissibility).
77Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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review for a trial court's admissibility determinations was the "abuse of
discretion" test, the Court addressed the trial judge's application of the
Daubert criteria to the plaintiff's expert testimony. According to the
Court, the testimony of both experts was based primarily upon on a
laboratory animal study and four epidemiological studies, none of which
could validly support a reliable scientific conclusion that PCBs were
capable of causing lung cancer in humans.
The animal study could not validly support that conclusion because
the animals were young (not middle-aged like the plaintiff), the route of
administration was different (direct injection of single doses into the
stomach as opposed to continuous dermal and inhalation exposure), the
doses the animals received were much larger than the plaintiffs exposure,
and the mice developed a different form of cancer. Although the Court
was willing to entertain the possibility that a trial court could appropriately
admit relevant expert testimony based upon valid animal studies that were
relevant to a plaintiffs exposure, the studies in this case "were so
dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the District Court to have rejected the experts' reliance on
them.",78 In other words, the district court was appropriately performing its
Daubert-assigned gatekeeper role when it concluded, apparently as a
matter of "sound science," that the plaintiff's experts could not validly rely
upon the animal study.
The four epidemiological studies upon which the plaintiffs experts
relied were likewise scientifically invalid for the purpose of demonstrating
that PCB exposure could cause lung cancer in humans. The first study of
workers exposed to PCBs in an Italian capacitor factory could not validly
support the plaintiff's experts' conclusion because, although the rate of
lung cancer deaths was "higher than might have been expected" in the
exposed cohort, the authors of the study concluded "there were apparently
no grounds for associating lung cancer deaths (although increased above
expectations) and exposure in the plant.",79 Since the authors of the study
were unwilling to conclude that the study demonstrated a causal
relationship between PCB exposure and lung cancer, the plaintiff's experts
could not validly rely upon that study, no matter what additional
supporting scientific information might be available.
78 Id. at 144-45.
79 Id. at 145 (quoting Bertazzi et al., Cancer Mortality of Capacitor Manufacturing
Workers, 11 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 165, 172 (1987)). Neither the trial court nor the
Supreme Court inquired into what might have motivated the authors to conclude that the
PCB exposures were not associated with the lung cancers.
(Vol. 26:1
LINKING CULPABILITY AND CAUSATION
The second study of workers exposed to PCBs at the Monsanto
Corporation's Sauget, Illinois PCB manufacturing facility also found the
incidence of lung cancer among PCB-exposed workers to be "somewhat
higher" than would ordinarily be expected, but its authors concluded that
since the increase was not "statistically significant," the data did not
suggest a link between PCB exposure and lung cancer.80 Neither the trial
court nor the Supreme Court elaborated on the degree of statistical
significance that would be required to support a valid conclusion that an
elevated incidence in lung cancer in PCB-exposed workers was linked to
the exposure. They were apparently content to rely upon the level of
significance demanded by the scientists who conducted the study. The
study could therefore not validly be relied upon by the plaintiff s experts to
support an overall conclusion that PCBs cause lung cancer in humans.
Although the third study of Norwegian employees of a cable
manufacturing plant did report a statistically significant increase in lung
cancer, it could not validly be relied upon by the plaintiff's experts
because it made no mention of PCBs and was limited to the particular
mineral oil to which the workers were exposed. 81 The Court did not
address the fact, obviously relied upon by the plaintiff's experts, that many
kinds of mineral oil contain PCBs. The plaintiffs experts apparently had
reason to believe that the mineral oil to which the Norwegian employees
had been exposed contained PCBs, but because the published study made
no mention of PCBs, it was, in the Court's view, irrelevant.
The fourth study appeared at first glance to be the holy grail for
which the trial judge was apparently searching. That study detected a
statistically significant increase in lung cancer deaths in a PCB-exposed
human cohort in Japan. Alas, that study, too, had to be rejected because
the "subjects of this study . . . had been exposed to numerous potential
carcinogens, including toxic rice oil that they had ingested., 82 Without
relying upon any expert statistical analysis, the trial judge apparently
concluded as a scientific matter that this confounding factor, which is
likely to be present in any Japanese cohort, had not been adequately
accounted for. The study was therefore invalid and could not support an
overall conclusion that PCBs cause lung cancer in humans.
80 Id. Again, neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court inquired into what might have
motivated the authors (who no doubt undertook the study at the behest of the Monsanto
Corporation) to conclude that the increase in lung. cancer was not
"statistically significant." Id.
81 Id. at 145-46.
82 Id. at 146.
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As the Joiner case very clearly reveals, the corpuscular approach
effectively prevents the expert in toxic torts cases from applying the
"weight-of-the-evidence" approach that regulatory agencies universally
83
employ in assessing the risks that toxic substances pose to human beings.
Under the weight-of-the-evidence approach, the agency considers all of the
proffered studies and determines the weight to be afforded each study on
the basis of the identified strengths and weaknesses of that study. Some
studies are so poorly conducted that they are entitled to no weight at all,
but many studies that are otherwise flawed in one or more regards may be
appropriately considered to the extent that they add to or detract from
conclusions based upon studies in which the agency is inclined to place
more confidence.8 4  Animal studies are properly considered under the
weight-of-the-evidence approach, as are meta-analyses of epidemiological
studies that may be flawed to some extent.8 5 The weight-of-the-evidence
83 See Brown, supra note 40, at 845 (arguing that although not specifically addressed in
Joiner, the court "implicitly rejected" the weight-of-the-evidence approach); see also
Gottesman, supra note 8, at 769-70; Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1068 (noting that
"[a]lthough the relevance of a single study may be a fairly straightforward determination,
relevance becomes more complicated when a number of studies are involved, each of
which is only marginally relevant, but which together purport to form the basis of an
expert's conclusions"); Finley, supra note 8, at 336-37 (observing that "[j]udges have
applied Daubert to subject each item of expert proof proffered by plaintiffs to substantive
causation law scrutiny, to see if it, standing alone, would prove both general and specific
causation"); Sanders, supra note 22, at 1416-17 (criticizing courts that do not preclude an
expert from relying on all of the available evidence). At least one post-Daubert court has
explicitly rejected an expert's conclusions based on a weight-of-the-evidence approach.
See Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1996).
84 See Sanders, supra note 22, at 1392 (noting that "scientific validity has multiple
meanings and is always a matter of degree").
85 EPA explained the weight-of-the-evidence approach in the context of carcinogen risk
assessment as follows:
Judgment about the weight of evidence involves considerations of the
quality and adequacy of data and consistency of responses induced by
the agent in question. The weight of evidence judgment requires
combined input of relevant disciplines. Initial views of one kind of
evidence may change significantly when other information is brought to
the interpretation. For example, a positive animal carcinogenicity
finding may be diminished by other key data; a weak association in
epidemiologic studies may be bolstered by consideration of other key
data and animal findings. Factors typically considered are illustrated in
figures below. Generally, no single weighing factor on either side
determines the overall weight. The factors are not scored mechanically
by adding pluses and minuses; they are judged in combination.
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approach, in fact, closely resembles the fact finding function of the jury in
civil trials in which testimony of varying degrees of quality and credibility
is offered from percipient witnesses.
The weight-of-the-evidence approach focuses upon the totality of the
scientific information and asks in a holistic way whether a cause-effect
conclusion seems warranted. Given the inevitability of flaws in individual
studies and the fact that some of the studies were not undertaken with the
litigative or regulatory process in mind, this necessarily involves the
exercise of scientific judgment grounded in scientific expertise. The
corpuscular approach focuses upon the inevitable flaws in individual
studies and asks whether a sufficient number of unflawed studies that are
sufficiently relevant to the causation issue remain to support a conclusion
that is in itself relevant and reliable. Under the corpuscular approach, a
study is either valid or invalid, and it is either relevant or irrelevant. A
conclusion based upon invalid or irrelevant studies cannot be relevant and
reliable and must therefore be rejected. Thus, the courts applying the
corpuscular approach to determining the admissibility of expert testimony
have adopted a remarkably different, and arguably much less scientific,
86
approach to causation than the regulatory agencies charged with the
responsibility of protecting citizens from toxic risks.
b. Preponderance of the Evidence and Statistical Proof Under the
Corpuscular Approach
In the Daubert remand, the court of appeals concluded that
California tort law, like the law of most states, required the plaintiff to
establish that the exposure to the defendant's toxic agent "more likely than
not" caused the plaintiffs disease. 87 Writing for the majority, Judge
Kozinski observed that in statistical terms this required the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the substance "more than doubled" the likelihood that the
plaintiffs disease resulted from exposure to the defendant's toxic agent.
Because the "background" incidence of birth defects of the sort that the
plaintiffs suffered was one per thousand births, the plaintiffs would have
to introduce epidemiological evidence showing that ,"among children of
mothers who took Bendectin the incidence of such defects was more than
Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,963,
17,981 (Apr. 23, 1996).
86 See id. (criticizing Daubert/Joiner as being inconsistent with the scientific method).
87 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
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two per thousand. 88 This suggests that a relative risk of greater than 2.0
in a well-conducted epidemiological study is sufficient to establish general
causation.
89
The Daubert remand opinion is less clear as to whether a well-
conducted epidemiological study demonstrating a doubling of the relative
risk is necessary to establish general causation in toxic tort cases. Several
courts have read the Daubert remand opinion to conclude that an
epidemiological study demonstrating a relative risk of greater than 2.0 is in
fact the minimum showing necessary to prove general causation. 9° This
position is by no means compelled by the Supreme Court's Daubert
opinion, which does not even preclude a jury's finding of causation based
exclusively upon animal studies.91 Other courts have sensibly refused to
make such a showing a threshold requirement.
92
88 Id. at 1320.
89 The term "relative risk" in epidemiology is defined as the ratio R1/R2, where R1 is the
risk of contracting the relevant disease as measured in the exposed population and R2 is
the risk of contracting the disease in an equivalent unexposed population. See GERALD W.
BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS 3, 352,
354 (1994); see also GREEN, supra note 21, at 28; Beecher-Monas, supra note 39, at
1600-01.
90 See In re Breast Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998); see also
Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Hall v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996); Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997); Finley, supra note 8, at
339, 350 (concluding that appellate courts in the pre-Daubert and post-Daubert
Bendectin cases through various devices gradually adopted a legal rule that "unless
plaintiffs could produce a consistent body of statistically significant epidemiological
studies that showed that Bendectin at least doubled the risk of birth defects, plaintiffs did
not have sufficient evidence of causation to support a verdict"); Mark Geistfeld, Scientific
Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1012-13 (2001).
91 Professor Finley suggests that federal judges have employed their Daubert-inspired
screening role to change the substantive law of toxic torts by demanding plaintiffs put on
proof of causation that is not only scientifically reliable, but also meets a substantive
criterion imposed by the judges. Finley, supra note 8, at 335.
92 See Schudel v. Gen. Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997); Pick v. Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1160 (E.D. La. 1997); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d
1079 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1992) (observing that "a relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password
to a finding of causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider
in determining whether the expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or
her conclusion").
Professor Klein has offered an interesting permutation in which tort law would
"permit enhanced risk recovery on a proportional basis [prior to contracting the disease],
but only when a plaintiff can prove that the toxic exposure has more than doubled her risk
of contracting disease in the future." Klein, supra note 43, at 117. Under the proposal
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There is nothing magical about a relative risk of 2.0.93 A relative
risk exceeding 1.0 indicates that there is an association between the
exposure and the disease, and a relative risk of 2.0 by no means guarantees
that any particular incidence of disease is attributable to the exposure.
94
The EPA, for example, concluded that nonsmoker exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke caused lung cancer on the basis of a "meta-
analysis" combining many studies that indicated a relative risk of 1.42.9'
The level of relative risk sufficient to support governmental action (in this
instance, shifting wealth from the manufacturer of a product to persons
who have been exposed to the product and suffer from a disease associated
with the product) is ultimately a policy decision, not a matter of science.
The courts that insist upon a relative risk of 2.0 in all cases have employed
a very conservative policy of requiring manufacturers to pay money to
claimants only when the decisionmaker is very confident that the
anyone who could demonstrate that exposure to a toxic substance increased the relative
risk of contracting a disease by 2.0 or greater could recover inunediately for the risk of
contracting the disease, whether or not the plaintiff had actually contracted the disease.
See id. at 119. One wonders how frequently plaintiffs would recover under this proposed
regime. It takes an especially rare cancer or an especially powerful chemical to produce a
relative risk of 2.0. The proposal also has no role for animal studies to play in
establishing causation. Id.
93 One perceptive state court noted that such a threshold requirement would mean that no
plaintiff could recover for exposure to a substance that presented a relative risk of 1.99
whereas every plaintiff could recover when the relative risk was 2.01. Grassis v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 676 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
94 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 39, at 1601. Scientists are generally more confident
that the apparent association is real if the "confidence interval" (the statistical range
through which the statistician is ninety-five percent confident the real result lies) does not
go below 1.0. See Brown, supra note 40, at 843 (explaining why most courts require a
"p" value of 0.05 or less). The number 95, like the number 2.0, has no magical
significance. The level of statistical significance that a scientist demands is merely a
numerical representation of the willingness of the scientist to draw an erroneous
conclusion. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1095. Most epidemiologists are
skeptical of binary approaches to epidemiological data that reject altogether studies that
do not achieve a particular level of statistical significance. See ROTHMAN & GREENLAND,
supra note 56, at 6 (complaining of "the practice of declaring associations in data as
'statistically significant' or 'nonsignificant,' using arbitrary criteria that became
conventional"). By filtering out all statistical studies that reject the null hypothesis with a
degree of confidence less that ninety-five percent, the courts are applying a "mighty
damned confident" standard to statistical evidence that may in many cases be the only
available evidence on causation.
95 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING:
LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS 5-2 (EPA/600/6-90/006F 1992) [hereinafter FINAL
EPA ETS REPORT].
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claimants are in fact victims.96 One could just as easily view this as a
policy of shielding manufacturers of dangerous products from
accountability through tort law.
c. Laboratory Animal Testing
From a corpuscular perspective, laboratory animal studies are
generally superior to epidemiological studies, because they can be
designed in advance to meet stringent scientific criteria. 97 Although flaws
inevitably arise in the execution of animal studies, they are generally more
difficult to challenge on scientific grounds. Consequently, defendants go
to great lengths to persuade trial judges to exclude animal studies on
relevance grounds. This tactic has proved highly successful in cases in
which reliable epidemiological studies are not available.98 If anything, the
post-Daubert courts have shown more reluctance than pre-Daubert courts
to admit expert testimony based solely upon animal testing data,99
evidence that administrative agencies like EPA and the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA") have for. three decades found
96 See Finley, supra note 8, at 363 (concluding that a court that demands epidemiological
studies demonstrating a relative risk greater than 2.0 as proof of causation in toxic tort
cases exalts epidemiology above other scientific disciplines, and makes the same highly
conservative value choice on causation that epidemiology itself makes: it is worse to
conclude that there is a causal relationship when in fact there turns out not to be one (a
Type I false positive error), than it is to conclude that there is no causal relationship when
in fact there is such a relationship (a Type II false negative error)). See also Brennan,
supra note 43, at 62.
97 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1064-65. The usefulness of laboratory animal
data can therefore be enhanced considerably by pharmacokinetic studies on the animals
and on human beings. Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed.
Reg. 56,274, 56,302 (Oct. 31, 1996); Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk
Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798, 63,813 (Dec. 5, 1991).
98 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 39, at 1609.
99 See Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1480 (D.V.I. 1994)
(finding that the "notion that one can accurately extrapolate from animal data to humans
to prove causation without supportive positive epidemiologic studies is scientifically
invalid"), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 729-30 (Tex. 1997) (rejecting animal studies as unreliable under Texas
equivalent of Daubert); Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1064-65 (collecting cases);
Cutler, supra note 37, at 216 (observing that "the pre-Daubert trend in excluding opinions
based on animal studies is continuing"). But see In re Paoli Ry. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.
3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1997) (expressing willingness to find animal testing admissible when
the expert demonstrates good grounds for the toxicological conclusions drawn by the
studies and good grounds for extrapolating from animal studies to human exposures).
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fully relevant to assessing and managing the risks posed by toxic
substances.100 Scientists and federal regulators are well aware of the
limitations of animal studies, but they know that it is unscientific to
disregard that important source of information altogether, and they are
frequently willing to draw conclusions about human health risks without
confirming epidemiological studies.' 0'
100 The pesticides aldrin/dieldrin and heptachlor/chlordane were canceled on the basis of
animal studies, even though the registrants were able to offer limited epidemiological
research that showed no increase in relative risk. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977)
(heptachlor/chlordane); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1242 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (aldrin/dieldrin). See also Synthetic Organic Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d
385, 387 (1974) (ruling that OSHA may rely upon animal studies in setting occupational
health standards); see also Synthetic Organic Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155,
1159 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (same); see also Cutler, supra
note 37, at 202.
101 See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS 22 (1983); see also Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter,
Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other Environmental
Disease in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 33, 34 (1985); see also Beecher-Monas,
supra note 8, at 1064 (suggesting that the reluctance of some courts to admit expert
testimony based upon animal studies "reflects the courts' ignorance of basic scientific
precepts").
In recent years, scientists have developed less expensive tests for carcinogenicity
that probe, inter alia, the mutagenic potential of an agent in in vitro conditions. See NAS
RED BOOK, supra note 49, at 22 ("Considerable experimental evidence supports the
proposition that most chemical carcinogens are mutagens and that many mutagens are
carcinogens."). Although such tests can provide "supportive evidence" of carcinogenicity,
they are not sufficiently accurate to support such a finding standing alone. Id. at 23
("Such data, in the absence of a positive animal bioassay, are rarely, if ever, sufficient to
support a conclusion that an agent is carcinogenic."). Risk assessors can also consider the
chemical structure of an agent as compared with the chemical structure of a substance
with a known toxicity to assess the hazard that it might pose to humans. Id.
("Comparison of an agent's chemical or physical properties with those of known
carcinogens provides some evidence of potential carcinogenicity."). Since it is well
known that two chemicals that have almost identical chemical structures can produce very
different toxicity end points, however, chemical structure is even weaker support for a
hazard assessment than in vitro tests. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR
IDENTIFYING PESTICIDE CHEMICALS AND OTHER SUBSTANCES THAT HAVE A COMMON
MECHANISM OF TOxICITY 4, 8 (Jan. 29, 1999); see also NAS RED BOOK, supra note 49,
at 23 ("[S]uch studies are best used to identify potential carcinogens for further
investigation and may be useful in priority-setting for carcinogenicity testing."). No court
has allowed a plaintiff to establish cause-in-fact in a toxic tort case based solely upon
either in vitro studies or structure-activity relationships or both, and no court is likely to in
the near future. See Sanders, supra note 22, at 1412-15.
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3. Specific Causation
If the toxic tort plaintiff is able to produce scientifically reliable
expert testimony to establish that the substance at issue is capable of
causing the plaintiffs disease, the plaintiff must still produce relevant and
reliable evidence that the plaintiffs own exposure to the substance caused
the plaintiff's disease. Specific causation poses difficult problems of proof
for toxic torts plaintiffs. First, the plaintiff must document exposure to the
substance or substances at issue.' 02 The plaintiff s lawyer can accomplish
this through direct testimony from the plaintiff or others when the
substance is well known to the plaintiff and the exposure is easily
detectable through sight or smell.'0 3 Even then, however, the quantitative
dose that the plaintiff received can rarely be established by direct lay
testimony. 104 Experts must extrapolate from the testimony to an overall
dose estimation through various modeling exercises. The growing
insistence of district courts upon fairly precise dose estimates means that
at the very least plaintiffs must establish the relevance and reliability of
expert testimony on that topic, and this frequently means that the plaintiff
is out of court.'
0 5
Second, specific causation has frequently proven to be an
insuperable barrier in toxic torts cases because of the long latency periods
that often exist between the exposure to a toxic substance and the onset of
102See Brown, supra note 40, at 843-44.
103 For example, an employee of a contractor who was told to remove liquid from a tank
marked "benzene" can probably establish dermal exposure to benzene by testifying as to
the content of the label and the fact that the benzene splashed on his hands and arms.
Inhalation exposure can be documented by direct testimony concerning fumes and foul
odors, though even this sort of testimony is unavailable in the case of odorless gasses.
Similarly ingestion of chemicals in drinking water can sometimes be documented by
testimony about the taste of the water.
104 Dose is fairly easily documented in cases involving prescription drugs, because the
dose is specified by a doctor. The problem of identifying which of many companies is
responsible for the particular drug that damaged the plaintiff has troubled the courts, but
has not proven an insurmountable obstacle to recovery. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly
and Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); see also Collins v. Eli Lilly and Co., 342 N.W.2d
37 (Wis. 1984); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
105 See Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort
Law, 1988-1991: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 42
(1993); see also Brinker, supra note 42, at 1300.
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disease. 10 6 Given all of the other exposures that the plaintiff will have
encountered during that time period, defendants have ample opportunities
to suggest alternative explanations for all but the clearest of signature
diseases, thereby casting doubt on the plaintiffs expert's testimony on
specific causation.'07 Indeed, a defendant can usually find something in
the plaintiff's own lifestyle or genetic makeup that could also have caused
the plaintiff's disease,10 8  and this invites probing and sometimes
embarrassing inquiries into the plaintiff's personal life.
4. Finding Flaws with Scientific Studies under the Corpuscular
Approach
The reluctance of the lower courts to accept testimony based
exclusively upon animal studies is profoundly conservative in that it forces
plaintiffs in toxic tort cases to rely almost exclusively upon
epidemiological studies. In addition to being very expensive and time
consuming to perform 0 9 epidemiological studies are by their very nature
laden with practical methodological difficulties that make them easy prey
for trial lawyers bent on casting doubt upon their "scientific validity.""1
0
106 Cutler, supra note 37, at 199.
107 See Berger, supra note 7, at 2121-22; see also Brennan, supra note 43, at 47.
108 See Brinker, supra note 42, at 1299-1300.
109 See GREEN, supra note 21, at 29 (noting that a large cohort study can cost as much as
$100 million); see also Geistfeld, supra, note 90, at 1012.
110 See Berger, supra note 7, at 2129 (noting that "epidemiological studies... are prone
to design errors and interpretative disputes"); Cutler, supra note 37, at 200-01; Sanders,
supra note 22, at 1417 (noting that epidemiology "inevitably suffers from some internal
validity problems"). Professor Feldman provides a brief synopsis of the problems that
plaintiffs may encounter in attempting to establish causation on the basis of
epidemiological studies:
First, epidemiological studies are generally unable to detect small
increases in the risk of harmful effects from a substance, especially if
the background risks of the same harmful effects are extremely low.
Second, epidemiological studies typically lack follow-up times long
enough to ensure that diseases with long latency periods are discovered.
Third, epidemiological studies may suffer from a number of biases such
as selection bias, which occurs when the exposed group is selected in a
way that makes it more or less susceptible to disease for reasons
independent of exposure; diagnostic bias, which occurs when the
disease in question is not accurately determined; exposure bias, which
is the danger of selecting a study population especially likely or
unlikely to have been exposed to the disease; and recall bias, which is
20011
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Professor Sanders has perceptively noted that "[m]uch of what goes on at
trial in America is a process of deconstructing science." III The
remarkable array of internal documents produced 'during the recent
tobacco litigation, makes it clear that the process of deconstruction starts
long before the trial. The planned obfuscation begins when the first
scientific studies and reports begin to appear, and it continues well beyond
the point at which most reasonable members of the scientific community
have drawn scientific conclusions based upon the weight of the available
evidence. 1 12
As the evidence mounted in the mid-1950s that cigarette smoking
caused lung cancer in smokers, the industry's public relations firm, Hill &
Knowlton, developed a four-part proactive strategy for dealing with the
emerging scientific studies that included:
(a) smearing and belittling them; (b) trying to overwhelm them
with mass publication of the opposed viewpoints of other
specialties; (c) debating them in the public arena; or (d) we can
determine to raise the issue far above them, so they are hardly even
113mentioned .... 1
The industry created the Tobacco Industry Research Committee ("TIRC"),
later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR"), to fund projects
aimed at accomplishing these goals. 114 Under the broad oversight of a
the tendency of those who are in a study to recall incorrectly whether
they were exposed to the agent being studied. Fourth, epidemiological
studies may be flawed because of the presence of unaccounted-for
confounders-undiscovered factors that independently affect disease
rates in the studies population.
Feldman, supra note 15, at 25.
11ISanders, supra note 22, at 1437.112 The following discussion draws upon a much larger work in progress on how the
tobacco companies and others have attempted to "bend science" to shield themselves
from regulation and liability.
113Memorandum from Hill & Knowlton, to Members of the Planning Committee, quoted
in DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY 200 (2001).
114 KESSLER, supra note 113, at 200-01; see also RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES
205-09 (1996). An internal memo, written at a time of transition, explains the Council's
functions as follows:
(1) The existence of The Council demonstrates that the industry is
acting in good faith in supporting a serious scientific effort to
determine the effects of smoking on human health.
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prestigious Scientific Advisory Board, 1 5 the institution spent millions of
dollars funding research that was only very remotely connected to smoking
and health, but which allowed the industry to claim that it was searching
for the answers." 6  The research projects were frequently aimed at
drawing attention away from tobacco as a cause of disease.
With the publication of the Report of the Surgeon General's
Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health in 1964, the industry
recognized that it needed additional support from scientists who were not
so clearly associated with the tobacco business. It therefore created a
"Special Projects" fund to support a network of consultants who could be
depended upon to take the industry position in scientific publications,
congressional and administrative presentations, and in expert testimony in
court. t 7 The Special Projects were administered over the years by the
Committee of Counsel without any oversight by the CTR Scientific
Advisory Board. 1 8 As its name suggested, the Committee of Counsel was
composed of the general counsels of all of the major tobacco companies
and attorneys from four major industry firms.' 19 Its mission was "to seed
(2) The Council provides the industry with a direct avenue of
contact and intelligence in the field of medical research into
tobacco use and health.
(3) The Council provides the industry with its own scientific
experts who may also serve as scientific spokesmen.
(4) Research supported by The Council may either disprove the
allegations that smoking is a primary etiological factor in some
diseases or it may suggest ways of adapting or modifying
cigarettes.
Memorandum from Simon O'Shea, to W. T. Hoyt (Aug. 18, 1965) (on file with author).
115See Letter from Robert C. Hockett, to Theodor D. Sterling (Feb. 13, 1963) (on file
with author) (explaining the role of the TIRC Scientific Advisory Board).
116 See KLUGER, supra note 114, at 206, 208.
117 See KESSLER, supra note 113, at 203. Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler
noted that "[s]pecial [p]rojects had no official address, no incorporation papers, no board
of directors, no by-laws, and no accountability." Id. at 204.
118 See Letter from Robert C. Hockett, to Theodor D. Sterling (June 15, 1964) (on file
with author) (explaining that the persons approving special projects were "not bound in
any way by [the Scientific Advisory Board's] judgments or advice but are free to consider
an suggestions we can get from them on their merits").
I I'KESSLER, supra note 113, at 204.
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the universities with research money and grow an unassailable crop of
advocates."'
120
The tobacco industry is by no means the only industry to attempt to
"deconstruct science" by financing scientific research aimed specifically at
discrediting published studies and government reports.' 21 After a cellular
telephone company was sued in 1993 by the husband of a frequent cell
phone user who had died of brain cancer, the cellular telephone industry's
trade association followed the tobacco industry model in virtually every
particular. 22 As news of the lawsuit caused cell phone company stock
prices to drop precipitously, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association ("CTIA") mounted a well-financed public relations campaign
to put the industry's spin on the issue. 123  The industry recognized,
however, that it would have to launch a scientific offensive as well as a PR
offensive. With much fanfare, the CTIA announced that the industry
would sponsor a $25 million Wireless Technology Research ("WTR")
program to get to the bottom of the issue.1 24 The trade association's press
statement announced that it was "time for truth and good science to
replace emotional videotape and unsupported allegations."'
125
The CTIA hired epidemiologist George Carlo in 1993 to direct the
WTR, the overt goal of which was to "re-validate" the studies showing
that cell phones were safe.' 26 A covert purpose of the project was to find
flaws with studies that were beginning to indicate that cell phones did pose
health risks.' 27 Like the TIRC/CTR, Carlo's project created a Scientific
Advisory Board to oversee particular projects. 28 He also commissioned
120 DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS 290 (Delacorte Press 2000). The Zegart book relates
the fascinating story of Gary Huber, a prominent beneficiary of grants from the CTR and
attorneys for the tobacco industry. Id. at 287-303.
121 See generally SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE'RE EXPERTS 200
(2001) (noting that "[t]he tobacco industry is hardly alone in attempting to influence the
scientific publishing process").
122 GEORGE CARLO & MARTIN SCHRAM, CELL PHONES: INVISIBLE HAZARDS IN THE
WIRELESS AGE (Carroll & Graf 2001) (relating the experience of a scientist who was
hired by the cell phone industry to study the health risks of cell phones, but lost his
funding and was sharply criticized by other scientists hired by the cell phone industry
after he concluded that cell phones posed some significant risks).
123 Id. at 9.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126Id. at 9-10.
127 Id. at 6.
128 CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 122, at 11-13.
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the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis to assemble a Peer Review Board to
review the project's outputs.' 29 Like the TIRC/CTR, the WTR sponsored
meetings of top scientists in an attempt to build a scientific consensus that
cell phone radiation was not dangerous.' 30  These measures were well
received in the scientific community and at the FDA, which had regulatory
authority over the health and safety aspects of cell phones.' 3 1
With an expensive Cray computer that the WTR made available to
him, one of the top radiation scientists in the country discovered that the
radiation patterns in petri dishes and test tubes were such that the places in
each of those vessels containing most of the cells being tested were "cold
spots" that did not in fact receive very much of the radiation that the cell
phone emitted. This rendered suspect all of the previously conducted in
vitro experiments in which scientists had concluded that cell phone
radiation had no impact upon human tissue.' 32 This did not mean that the
previous studies had reached erroneous conclusions, but it did suggest that
the cells used in those studies had not received as high a dose of radio
frequency radiation as the scientists had thought. Consequently, the
conclusions of previous studies that cell phones were safe were suspect.
At the same time, the WTR found flaws with all of the studies that
began to appear in the scientific literature in the early and mid-1990s
indicating that cell phones did present a cancer risk.133  When an
Australian study showed that whole-body exposure to radio frequency
waves caused a statistically significant increase in lymphomas in female
transgenic mice, the WTR scientific advisory board found numerous flaws
in the study and concluded that it did not require a public warning for cell
phones.134  A subsequent industry-sponsored scientific workshop
concluded that more research was needed before studies with transgenic
animals could support conclusions about human health hazards. 135 WTR
scientists were careful to acknowledge that the findings of the studies were
not necessarily wrong, but they did question the validity of each of the
studies as they appeared.' 36
129 Id. at 13.
130 Id. at 23.
131 Id. at 13.
132 Id. at 25-26.
133 Id. at 107.
134CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 122, at 115-18.
135Id. at 118.
136 Id. at 107.
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When the WTR appeared to be acting too independently of the
industry trade association's lobbyists, the industry became hostile.
137
Three years after creating the WTR, the CTIR stopped funding it.138 It
refused to fund epidemiological studies attempting to follow up on
complaints by cell phone users. One executive for a cell phone
manufacturer, when asked how much money his company was willing to
devote to follow up surveillance studies replied, "Zero. Zero surveillance.
We're going to do enough research so that we can prove safety-and then
we can stop doing research."' 39  With this attitude prevalent in the
industry, it should be a very long time before reliable epidemiological
studies are available on the health effects of cell phones. It is entirely
possible (in my view, probable) that experience will ultimately
demonstrate that cell phones are reasonably safe for the human population
in general. Yet, it is also possible that cell phones will cause some harm to
a small class of especially vulnerable cell phone users. No plaintiff has
recovered damages from a cellular telephone manufacturer for damages
caused by such telephones. Given the difficulty of assembling scientific
data capable of surviving Daubert/Joiner scrutiny, it is unlikely that any
plaintiff in the future will receive compensation, even if subsequent
federal agency risk assessments conclude that exposure to radio frequency
radiation from cell phones does increase the risk of contracting brain
cancer or some other disease.
The preceding examples suggest that entities who know that they are
potential defendants in toxic tort litigation can, in a post-Daubert/Joiner
regime, insulate themselves from liability (or at least delay liability for a
very long time) by paying scientists to analyze and critique scientific
studies as they are published in the scientific literature (or even before they
are published). Lawyers for defendants in toxic tort litigation have staked
out the position that courts should "exclude experts' opinions not only in
the absence of reliable support from hard data and accepted
methodologies, but also where the subject of the opinion is unsettled and a
matter of substantial scientific debate.' 140  Under this approach, a
defendant may secure the exclusion of scientific expert testimony by
creating the appearance of a substantial scientific debate. As the examples
above have demonstrated, generating the appearance of a substantial
137 Id. at 92.
ld. at 97, 126-27.
139 Id. at 141.
140 Rudlin, supra note 35, at 336.
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scientific debate is a fairly inexpensive proposition for most companies. It
is not at all clear that lay judges have the wherewithal to distinguish
unreliable expert testimony from reliable testimony based upon scientific
studies that have been "deconstructed" by paid industry consultants.
I1. THE WEAK DETERRENT EFFECT OF Toxic TORT LITIGATION
One of the primary goals of tort law is to deter conduct that poses
unreasonable risks to others.141 Like the prospect of punishment through
criminal sanctions and administrative penalties, the threat of tort liability
should encourage potential wrongdoers to behave properly. Yet, if
plaintiffs rarely recover in toxic tort litigation because of difficulties in
proving causation under the corpuscular approach, the tort system will
send very weak signals to potential defendants to adjust their conduct so as
to prevent future harm.'
4 2
Little empirical evidence exists to support the proposition that the
threat of being sued for a toxic tort has much of a deterrent effect on those
who expose humans to toxic risks. 143 The absence of evidence is not at all
surprising because a company has very little to gain and nothing to lose
from keeping itself and the world ignorant of the risks that its products
pose to others. 144 There is, however, much anecdotal evidence that the net
result of setting a high threshold for admissibility of expert testimony in
toxic substances is that potential toxic tort defendants have little to fear in
cases not involving signature diseases.
When EPA issued a comprehensive risk assessment (after four years
of deliberation and two reviews by EPA's Science Advisory Board) that
concluded that Environmental Tobacco Smoke ("ETS") was a "Group A"
141 See Brennan, supra note 43, at 5; see also Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1128.
142 See Feldman, supra note 15, at 41 (placing the burden of proving cause-in-fact on the
plaintiff in mass toxic tort cases "will not reliably promote optimal levels of safety: it will
underdeter excessively risky behavior"); see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier,
Risks, Courts, Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1046 (1990) (alluding to "access
bias," resulting from the decision by potential plaintiffs (and their potential attorneys) that
a lawsuit, however justified in theory, will not be worthwhile because environmental risks
are "diffuse in their impacts, and of low probability"); Klein, supra note 43, at 1176.
143 See Brennan, supra note 43, at 6 (concluding that "[e]mpirical evidence suggests that
environmental torts suits currently send a weak deterrent signal"); see also Beecher-
Monas, supra note 8, at 1092.
144 Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 773, 774, 794-95 (1997).
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human carcinogen (the most potent category in the agency's lexicon), a
prominent law firm wrote a memorandum for the Tobacco Institute to
circulate to employers, the hospitality industry, and others who might
anticipate liability actions due to cancers arising from ETS exposures.
After attacking the scientific validity of the EPA report, the memo noted
that:
[e]ven if EPA's report was viewed in court as establishing
that ETS can cause lung cancer, that still would leave
unsatisfied the other prerequisites to a successful claim. In
any particular case, a nonsmoking employee who has
contracted lung cancer would have to prove both that his or
her lung cancer was caused by exposure to ETS (not
something else) and that his or her exposure to ETS in the
place under the employer's control (not other places) was
the proximate cause of the illness ... Even after the EPA's
report, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on both
points, and it is a very heavy burden to satisfy. Proving
causation from occasional exposure in a restaurant to other
public settings would be even more difficult. Not many
plaintiffs lawyers are likely to find the prospect of
pursuing cases of this nature attractive. 
45
Company documents produced during toxic tort litigation
involving the W.R. Grace insulating product Monokote revealed that the
company knew in 1977 that the product contained low levels of a
relatively rare form of asbestos called tremolite, but elected not to label the
product or otherwise inform consumers of that fact out of fear that
labeling would severely dampen sales of the product. The risk of liability
to workers and others of contracting cancer from exposure to Monokote
was, in the view of the company's lawyers, only "moderate."'146 A 1977
strategy memorandum concluded that "it seems unlikely that bona fide
145 Memorandum, Legal Significance of EPA's Classification of ETS as a "Group A"
Carcinogen (Jan. 18, 1993), PM Bates No. 2024103846. A memorandum of the same
date from the Tobacco Institute to various recipients indicates that this memorandum was
prepared by the law firm of Covington & Burling. Memorandum from Patrick B. Donoho
& Ronald C. Morris, to TI Legislative Consultants (Jan. 18, 1993), PM Bates No.
2047045168.
146 Michael Moss & Adrianne Appel, Company's Silence Countered Safety Fears About
Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2001, at Al.
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cases of personal harm could be well documented considering the pattern
of use and exposure levels of our customers."' 47  Thus, the threat of
potential liability had little impact on the corporate decision to continue to
market the product without warnings. Although W.R. Grace recently
declared bankruptcy as a result of liabilities incurred from litigation
involving earlier products that contained much higher levels of a more
potent form of asbestos, it may never be held accountable for its carefully
calculated decision to preserve its markets at the expense of putting its
customers at risk.
48
An absolute requirement that the toxic tort plaintiff present expert
testimony based upon a virtually flawless epidemiological study
demonstrating a relative risk of 2.0 or greater will effectively eviscerate
tort law as a deterrent to corporate misbehavior. Although most new
chemicals receive some sort of in vitro testing prior to marketing, there is
no general requirement that any testing be undertaken. 49  Most
epidemiological studies of chemicals are undertaken long after the
chemical has entered commerce and humans have been exposed for a
substantial period of time. Because epidemiological studies are very
expensive, they exist for only a very few chemicals.' 50 Once evidence that
a chemical may be toxic begins to accumulate, the manufacture is likely to
take measures to limit exposure to it, thereby reducing the number of
exposed individuals available for inclusion in epidemiological
investigations.151 No sane attorney is likely to take a case that has such a
small prospect of success and such a large potential for bankrupting
plaintiff's counsel.
Id.
148 See also Wagner, supra note 144, at 823-24 (citing evidence of "[c]orporate
concealment of adverse testing results occurring in the marketing of asbestos, the Dalkon
Shield, and breast implants" as "dramatic evidence that at least some corporations
perceive liability for certain types of latent harms as either unlikely or a risk that should
be significantly discounted as long as their own in-house research is concealed").
149 The Toxic Substances Control Act only requires that a manufacturer of a new
chemical provide EPA with advance notice of its intent to market the product. Toxic
Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1998). EPA may require testing only upon
making one of several findings related to the potential for the substance to cause adverse
environmental effects or to result in large exposure to human beings. See id. § 2603. I
am aware of no instance in which EPA has required a company to conduct an
epidemiological study.
150Ambrosini v. LaBarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cerl. dismissed, 520 U.S.
1205 (1997); see Geistfeld, supra note 90, at 1013.
151 See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 767.
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A legal system that demands a well-conducted epidemiological study
demonstrating a relative risk of greater than 2.0 as a necessary condition to
a plaintiffs toxic tort recovery is a legal system that is willing "to tolerate
or even encourage a high degree of uncertainty about the dangers of some
products, to reward manufacturers for ignoring risk, and to require
consumers to bear more of the burden of scientific uncertainty than
manufacturers.' 52 It is, in short, a system that is unwilling to assign to
tort law the function of holding companies accountable for the
consequences of their misbehavior, however culpable. It is my contention
that a legal regime that leaves corporate accountability entirely up to the
regulatory agencies and district attorneys enforcing the criminal law will
not easily withstand public scrutiny in the upcoming accountability crisis.
III. LINKING CULPABILITY TO CAUSATION IN A MIXED REGIME
The essence of the impending accountability crisis is the growing
public realization that major participants in the global economic
marketplace who have engaged in culpable, even outrageous conduct
frequently escape both punishment and their obligation to make their
victims whole. Although outrageous conduct is no less outrageous merely
because no one has been demonstrably injured, 153 the tort reparations
regime has traditionally demanded that a plaintiff demonstrate that the
defendant's act or failure to act caused some damage to the plaintiff as a
precondition to asking the law to shift wealth from a culpable defendant to
that plaintiffs pocket. The substantive law of torts, however, need not
require courts to adopt a corpuscular approach toward admitting scientific
evidence on causation. In my view, judicial adherence to the corpuscular
approach is not only unscientific, in that it is not how scientists go about
drawing scientific conclusions,' 54 it is also contrary to the letter and spirit
152 Finley, supra note 8, at 368.
153 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1790 ("[O]utrage may arise-for instance, over
defendants' suppression of information about product risk-wholly apart from whether
the product is ultimately proven as a scientific matter to cause the disease from which
plaintiffs suffer.").
154 See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 772 (arguing that "[i]t is not intrinsically
'unscientific' for experienced professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all
available scientific evidence-this is not the sort of junk science with which Daubert was
concerned"); Sanders, supra note 22, at 1416-17 (arguing that "from a scientific validity
perspective it would be preferable to form one's opinion about [toxic substances] based
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of the original Rule 702. That rule, in the Court's words, was intended to
"allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific
testimony than would have been admissible under Frye." The courts have
clearly steered things in the opposite direction.
To some extent this fairly strong judicial tendency to exclude
controversial testimony may be attributable to an understandable, if
inappropriate simplicity that has pervaded the post-Daubert/Joiner judging
process. Guided by the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, courts may be demanding a degree of perfection in the
design and execution of the scientific studies underlying scientific expert
testimony that has seldom characterized the scientific process and has
never characterized the process of practical decisionmaking in other
contexts involving scientific uncertainty.15 5 Judges are not scientists and
they have many other things to do with their limited time and resources.
The suggestion, inherent in the corpuscular approach, that careful attention
to the briefs and a quick read through the Reference Manual can provide
sufficient understanding of subtle scientific concepts to warrant wholesale
exclusion of scientific information from the scientific assessment process
betrays an unwarranted degree of confidence in the scientific
sophistication of the federal judiciary. 15 6 To allow legally trained judges,
however intelligent, to serve as arbiters of "sound science" is to invite
injustice and, in the final analysis, ridicule. 15 7 The end result will be, and,
frankly, should be, a decline in the respect that other institutions and the
public afford the judiciary.
on all of the available evidence: epidemiological, animal studies, in vitro and perhaps
even structure-activity").
155 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1076-77.
156 One solution to the problem of judicial ignorance is better guidance to the judges on
the nature of scientific proof and techniques for evaluating scientific information, and
legal scholars have offered many suggestions for filling that need. One of the most
thoughtful attempts to provide an heuristic for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence after Daubert is Professor Beecher-Monas' "primer." Beecher-Monas, supra
note 39. See also Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715, 782-86 (1994). I have concluded,
however, that the problem runs deeper than judicial ignorance.
157 Courts can acquire subtler input by assembling a panel of scientists with relevant
expertise to aid the judge in evaluating subtle scientific arguments. In addition to being
resource-intensive and time consuming, this vehicle for educating the judge still raises
questions about the ability of consensus-oriented groups to provide an adequate
translation of the nature of the scientific disagreements. See Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L.
REv. 801, 813-17 (2000).
2001 ]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
The post-Daubert/Joiner judicial eagerness to exclude expert
testimony may also reflect a growing distrust of juries on the part of the
current personnel on the bench.15 8 Judges may not believe that lay jurors
can assign the proper weight to the scientific studies underlying expert
testimony, even with the aid of vigorous cross-examination. The
corpuscular approach, with its binary view of the validity of scientific
studies, "stands in stark contrast to traditional and proper practice, which
sees the admissibility of evidence as a question quite distinct from the
sufficiency of evidence to meet a plaintiff's burden of proof."' 59 A similar
judicial distrust of the capacity of jurors to give proper weight to scientific
evidence may motivate the courts to exclude expert testimony based upon
animal studies. There is, of course, a certain arrogance in the implicit
assumption that lay judges can do a significantly better job than lay jurors
of determining the validity of scientific studies and the reliability of expert
testimony based upon scientific studies.
The judges may, however, be influenced by more than skepticism
about the intellectual capacity of jurors. Careful observers have noted that
jurors in toxic tort cases "might overlook weak evidence of causation
when confronted with strong evidence of misconduct on the part of the
defendant."' 160 It is, in my view, highly likely that the judiciary's eager
acceptance of the Daubert/Joiner corpuscular approach is motivated by a
reluctance to allow juries to commingle separate legal questions in this
fashion. Yet the decision to prevent such commingling is in fact a
normative policy judgment. There is nothing per se irrational about a
decisionmaker wanting to know the whole story when evaluating the
consequences of his or her decision. The constraints that the law places on
juries knowing the full story are generally motivated by "profoundly
normative" policy concerns "about the social allocation of risk and who
158 See Cutler, supra note 37, at 212-13.
159 Finley, supra note 8, at 337.
160 Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1168. See Elliott, supra note 38, at 788 ("[T]oday's toxic
tort cases are really white-collar crime cases; they have a lot more to do with the morality
of the defendants' conduct than they do with estimating dose-response relationships.");
Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1993) (noting that in the Bendectin litigation "plaintiffs often
attempted to commingle elements, thereby bolstering weak evidence on causation with
stronger proof of breach of duty and damages"); Wagner, supra note 144, at 828-29
(finding it "more than coincidental that in those cases in which juries have awarded
damages in spite of weak causation evidence, the defendant manufacturers' negligence in
testing often rose to the level of gross negligence or recklessness sufficient to support the
simultaneous award of punitive damages").
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should bear the burden of scientific uncertainty."' 161 The current judicial
tendency to exclude scientific expert testimony out of fear of jury
commingling reflects a policy of shielding culpable defendants from
liability for harm they did not clearly cause. Whether it is a good policy or
a bad one is a matter of legitimate debate.
It appears that a substantial number of sitting judges, persuaded by a
decade's worth of well-publicized "junk science" claims by industry-
sponsored tort reformers, are raising the bar to the admissibility of
scientific testimony in toxic torts cases out of a fear that the threat of jury
awards will impede economic development.' 62 Witness Justice Breyer's
invocation, in his Joiner concurring opinion, of the trial judge's obligation
to "assure that the powerful engine of tort liability, which can generate
strong financial incentives to reduce, or to eliminate, production, points
,463
towards the right substances and does not destroy the wrong ones.' The
recent judicial embrace of the corpuscular approach and the manifest
judicial hostility to expert testimony based on animal studies represents a
policy judgment not to subject manufacturers of valuable products to the
"powerful engine of tort liability" for substances that have not clearly been
shown to cause toxic effects in humans. This judicially adopted policy of
erring on the side of protecting the assets of risk-producing enterprises
varies dramatically from the policy of erring on the side of safety
employed by federal regulatory agencies operating under federal health
and safety statutes.'
64
The quiet judicial tort reform achieved by Daubert/Joiner predates
the extraordinary revelations during the recent tobacco litigation of the
extent to which some products liability defendants are prepared to go to
manipulate scientific data to avoid accountability. As time passes and
more apparently deserving plaintiffs are deprived of their day in court by
aggressive admissibility rulings, the role that Daubert/Joiner has played in
the resulting accountability crisis will become apparent. The calls that are
already being heard to repair a broken system of business-oriented judicial
lawmaking will intensify as more stories of unpunished corporate
malfeasance impinge upon the public consciousness.'
65
161 Finley, supra note 8, at 335-36.
162 See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 759.
163 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1997). See Finley, supra note 8, at
344.
164 The policy judgment also varies from the policies underlying the substantive law of
torts in most states. See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 762.
165 See BUCCINO ET AL., supra note 6.
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One possible "quick fix" to forestall the upcoming accountability
crisis would be for Congress to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to
remove (or greatly reduce) the trial judge's screening role. Unfortunately,
it is probably too late in the day to attempt to induce the courts to abandon
the corpuscular approach and restore the power of juries to assess the
weight of the evidence through a more liberal interpretation of Rule 702.
With surprising speed, the lower courts wove Daubert/Joiner into the
fabric of tort law, and it will be difficult to undo those changes with
language that will itself be open to judicial interpretation. Indeed, Rule
702 has recently been amended to incorporate the Daubert/Joiner tests."'
In any event, subtle changes in the text of obscure rules will do little to
alleviate public pressure for substantive reform. More radical institutional
surgery will probably be required.
In the remainder of this article, I propose an institutional reform that
will draw upon the ability of federal agencies to employ a weight-of-the-
evidence approach toward scientific proof and that will acknowledge the
tendency of the jury to commingle evidence of causation with evidence of
culpability in basing verdicts on their conception of the "whole story."
The regime described below retains the basic structure of the tort regime,
but incorporates an administrative agency's assessment of the scientific
evidence and employs rebuttable presumptions that vary with the degree of
the defendant's culpability.
A. The Possibility of Presumptions in Tort Litigation
A mandatory legal presumption is a proven technique for arresting
the tendency of judges to take decisionmaking power away from juries. If
judicial adoption of a corpuscular approach to admissibility in
combination with the common law rule that the plaintiff has the burden of
proof means as a practical matter that plaintiffs can never win, 167 then one
solution may be to lighten the burden of proof with a presumption.' 68
166 FED. R. EvID. 702. The Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 702 was amended
"in response to" Daubert and "to the many cases applying Daubert." Id. advisory
committee's note.
167 See Feldman, supra note 15, at 44 (suggesting that this is the case).
168 See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 438, 439 n.197 (D. Utah 1984)
(employing a presumption in favor of causation in the context of egregious conduct on the
part of the United States government in exposing plaintiffs to heavy doses of radiation
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Courts frequently create presumptions to correct imbalances caused by one
party's greater access to reliable evidence. 169  Some presumptions are
simply created by courts to "favor certain parties or claims for social and
economic reasons."' 7 °  Administrative compensation regimes, for
example, frequently erect rebuttable presumptions to advance particular
social goals. 171 Courts also erect presumptions on particular contested
issues as a way of sanctioning improper conduct that occurs during
without their knowledge). See generally Brinker, supra note 42, at 1321-23; Gottesman,
supra note 8, at 779-80.
Professor Geistfeld argues that burden shifting is not necessary to alleviate
unfairness in products liability litigation regarding toxic products. He believes that the
plaintiff can ensure that her case comes before the jury by claiming that the manufacturer
failed adequately to warn. Once that claim is proved, the plaintiff can produce evidence
of increased risk of contracting a disease as part of the proof of damages. Geistfeld,
supra note 90, at 1014. While Professor Geistfeld persuasively argues that the courts
should not require epidemiological proof of a relative risk of 2.0 at the damages phase of
a failure to warn products liability case, his solution leaves out a vast number of toxic tort
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who allege damage due to involuntary exposure environmental
contaminants, for example, do not have an obvious failure to warn claim. In these cases,
Professor Geistfeld suggests that it is not especially unfair to place the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, because to shift the burden would be equally unfair to the innocent
defendant. Id. at 1023-32. This may be true, but it does not address intermediate
solutions short of placing a burden of demonstrating a relative risk of greater than 2.0 by
epidemiological evidence. Courts could, for example, allow the jury to find causation
based upon animal studies or epidemiological studies demonstrating a relative risk of less
than 2.0, a possibility that Professor Geistfeld recognizes. Id. at 1032-36. Or courts
could, as suggested here, demand that the plaintiff establish a high degree of culpability
on the part of the defendant as a precondition to burden shifting, thus alleviating any
unfairness to innocent defendants.
169See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 39, at 242 (explaining the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur).
170 SUPERFUND § 301(E) STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS
WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES (July 1982) reprinted in
Hearings on Compensation for Exposure to Hazardous Substances Before the Subcomm.
on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 97th Cong. 154,
182 (1982) [hereinafter CERCLA SUPERFUND § 301 (E) STUDY GROUP REPORT].
171 For example, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended,
erects a rebuttable presumption that any miner suffering from black lung disease
(pneumoconiosis) who can demonstrate that he or she has been exposed to coal mines for
more than ten years contracted the disease as a result of that exposure. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-
962, 921(c) (1977). See CERCLA SUPERFUND § 301(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra
note 170, at 190-91.
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litigation.172 Several commentators have offered creative suggestions for
creating causation presumptions in various toxic torts contexts. 1
73
1. The Berger Proposal
In a perceptive essay on general causation in toxic torts, Professor
Margaret Berger criticizes the tendency of the lower courts to apply
Daubert strictly to exclude testimony on general causation when the
underlying science is unclear.' 74 In her view, proponents of the strict
approach and reformers who would lodge decisionmaking power in
entities other than the jury "appear unconcerned with protecting persons
from harm while there is insufficient or indeterminate knowledge
regarding the potential adverse effects of a product, or with appraising the
need for interim 'protective measures while uncertainty persists."'
175
Because "[c]ausation knocks out the link between culpability and
liability,"' 76 the plaintiffs burden of proving causation in toxic tort cases
prevents the liability regime from discouraging negligent corporate
conduct. Professor Berger therefore proposes a "new tort that conditions
culpability on the failure to develop and disseminate significant data
needed for risk assessment.' '177 She would accomplish this by expanding
the scope of personal liability for corporate officers and by holding a
company liable to "those put at risk by its action, without regard to injuries
that eventually ensue.' 78
As a practical matter, Professor Berger's proposal would impose
liability upon products liability defendants without requiring plaintiffs to
172 For example, an appropriate sanction for unauthorized document destruction or
similar discovery abuse might be an order reversing the burden of proof on a particular
issue in the trial. See, e.g., Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484, 490-92 (Alaska
1995) (addressing missing medical records resulting from defendant's misconduct by
shifting the burden of proof on negligence and causation to defendant); see also RALPH
NADER ET AL, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 138-39 (1996) (raising the burden of proof as sanction for document
destruction).
173 Finley, supra note 8, at 367 n.102 (describing suggestions of three scholars for
shifting the burden of proof on causation in toxic torts contexts).
174 Berger, supra note 7.
175 Id. at 2131.
176 Id. at 2134.
177 Id. at 2140.
178 Id. at 2134.
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prove general causation.179  A court would impose liability on the
manufacturer of a product if it was negligent in failing "to provide
substantial information relating to risk."'' ° Conversely, a defendant would
be relieved of liability if it "met the required standard of care for
developing and disseminating information relevant to risk.'' l In addition,
a defendant could avoid liability by proving that the product did not cause
the plaintiff's disease, and it could reduce liability by proving that the
plaintiffs disease was at least partially attributable to some other toxic
exposure. 8 2 Finally, actual damages (perhaps excluding compensation for
pain and suffering) would be awarded through an accompanying
administrative regime, 8 3 and punitive damages would not be allowed at
all. 184
Although the Berger proposal represents a significant improvement
upon the existing post-Daubert/Joiner regime, it may not be the best
general solution to the causation problem in toxic tort cases. First, the
scope of Professor Berger's proposal is necessarily limited to products
liability litigation. Its primary purpose is to use tort law to motivate
corporations to collect and disseminate risk-related information about the
products that they market. It does not speak at all to corporate
responsibility for the by-products that they release into the environment.
Second, the Berger proposal presumes that there is some agreed-
upon standard for the kind and amount of risk-related testing that a
manufacturer should employ in the case of any given product. The clearest
cases of properly imposed liability for failure to test would be situations in
which a company conducted testing but did not report the results to
relevant regulatory agencies or the public and situations in which a
company initiated testing but terminated it in anticipation of receiving bad
results. 185 In both of these instances, however, the corporation has in a
sense defined its own benchmark and failed to come up to that standard.
A testing regime prescribed by an administrative agency could provide the
needed benchmark, but regulatory agencies rarely specify in detail all of
the tests that must be performed, preferring instead to make such
179 Id. at 2143.
180 Berger, supra note 7, at 2143.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 2145.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Berger cites RJR Corporation's dismantling of a rabbit testing laboratory. Id. at 2142.
2001]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
determinations on a "tiered" or case-by-case basis.186 Thus, in cases in
which the manufacturer did not define its own benchmark, the jury would
be in the position of determining the proper testing regime for toxic
substances, no doubt with the aid of Daubert-reliable expert witnesses.
Third, Professor Berger's plan is vague on how the courts would
determine which diseases are compensible. Surely, she does not mean to
allow any person with any disease to draw funds from a culpable entity
merely upon a showing that he or she was exposed to the product at issue.
Yet without adequate testing and/or epidemiological data, it will be
difficult to know what diseases are associated With exposures to the
product at issue. It may be that the accompanying administrative regime
will adequately address this problem, but the scope of the proposal's
applicability is a question that its implementers will need to address.
Fourth, while Professor Berger makes a plausible case for the
proposition that eliminating general causation is a fair trade-off for a
similar elimination of punitive damages, the absence of the punitive
damages allure may discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from expending the
resources that are required to conduct discovery and put on a trial relevant
to the defendant's misconduct.18 7 In the context of toxic torts involving
exposure to a by-product, one would expect the courts in fairness to
potential defendants to demand at least a showing that the plaintiff was
exposed to the defendant's by-product. Such a showing would presumably
still be required as a matter of the plaintiffs burden of demonstrating
specific causation. As Jan Schlichtmann's well-documented experience
with the contamination of water wells in Woburn, Massachusetts
demonstrates,' 88 this frequently requires additional expensive proof that
trial lawyers will be reluctant to undertake in the absence of a promise of a
high payout by way of punitive damages.' 89
186 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in
EPA's Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 140-
41(2001).
187 See Berger, supra note 7, at 2149-50 (recognizing that "[i]t would, of course, be
costly and time consuming to establish a defendant's failure to exercise due care in
obtaining and disseminating substantial information about risk").
188 See HAAR, supra note 14.
189 The fear that out-of-control juries will arbitrarily award punitive damages seems
misplaced. A recent study of judges and juries concluded that juries do not differ greatly
from judges in determining whether punitive damages should be allowed and in
determining the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded. See William
Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6,
2001, at A9.
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2. The Broin Settlement
The omnibus settlement in the Broin litigation between a large class
of airline flight' attendants and the tobacco industry adopted a
presumption/rebuttal approach that was consciously designed to provide a
substantive advantage to plaintiffs in the individual actions that followed
the omnibus settlement. Although the tobacco company defendants agreed
to pay the class plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and establish a $300 million fund
for research ETS, 190 the Settlement did not finally resolve any individual
claims for damages attributable to ETS exposure. Individual members of
the class retained the right to bring individual claims for compensatory
(but not punitive) damages against the defendant tobacco companies based
on any theory other than fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy, or
intentional tort. With respect to any claim seeking damages for lung
cancer, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, or chronic sinusitis, the burden of proof on the question of general
causation (i.e., whether ETS "can cause one of the above-described
diseases") 191 would fall on the defendant and the jury would be so
instructed. The settlement then provided that "[i]n all other respects,
including the issue of whether an individual plaintiffs disease was caused
by ETS ('specific causation'), the ordinary burdens of proof' would
remain unaltered.19
2
By the time that the extended limitations period provided for in the
settlement agreement had expired, approximately 3125 individual flight
attendants had filed individual claims. 193 Prior to the first trial, the original
Broin trial judge issued an interpretation of the agreement that limited the
issues at trials involving plaintiffs with one or more of the five named
diseases (lung cancer, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, and chronic sinusitis) to the questions of specific
causation and the extent of damage. The court read the settlement
agreement to waive the plaintiffs otherwise applicable burden of proving
a breach of the relevant standard of care and proximate causation.' 94 This
190Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Case No. 91-49738CA(22), 7, 10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9,
1997) (Settlement Agreement).
191 Id. 12(d).
192 Id.
193 See Appellants' Initial Brief at 1, Philip Morris Cos. v. Jett'(3d Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (Civ. No. 3D00-3189).
194See id. at 9.
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holding was appealed and most cases were held in abeyance pending the
outcome of the appeal. 1
95
One case involving a dying plaintiff, however, was allowed to go
forward. In that case, brought by flight attendant Marie Fontana, the jury
at the end of a three-week trial held in favor of the four defendant tobacco
companies. 196  The Fontana case may have been unique, because the
plaintiffs primary lung-related ailment was an affliction called
sarcoidosis, an ideopathic disease that scientists have thus far not
associated with cigarette smoking.' 97 The plaintiffs had hoped to prove to
the jury that the plaintiff also suffered from emphysema and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, two diseases which (according to the terms
of the Broin settlement) were presumptively caused by environmental
tobacco smoke, and that the sarcoidosis was exacerbated by those
diseases. 98 Although the defendants put on expert testimony to rebut the
general causation presumption, the court held as a matter of law that the
testimony had not rebutted that presumption.'
99
195 The defendants argued on appeal that the court's holding is difficult to square with the
language in paragraph 12(d) of the settlement agreement that says: "in all other respects,
including the issue of whether an individual plaintiff's disease was caused by ETS
('specific causation'), the ordinary burdens of proof applicable to any Retained Claims
shall remain unaltered." Id. at 14. The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the intent of the
parties in settling the Broin litigation was to bring Stage I of that trial to an end and to
allow Stage II to proceed on a case-by-case basis with the issues being limited to those
concerning the individual plaintiffs. Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Philip Morris Cos. v.
Jett (3d Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Civ. No. 3D00-3189). Since issues common to all of
the plaintiffs had been excluded from Stage II of Broin, the parties intended for such
issues to be excluded from each of the individual trials that were governed by the
settlement. Id. They further noted that the trial court and the court of appeals would
never have approved the Broin settlement if it had required the plaintiffs to prove all of
the elements of their toxic tort claims except for general causation. Id. at 12-15.
196 Fontana v. Philip Morris Cos., Civ. No. 00-0173 ICA (09) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 19,
2001).
197 See Terri Somers, Experts: Tobacco Lawsuits Still Viable; Secondhand Smoke Cases
Will Be Pursued, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 8, 2001, at B 1.
198 Myron Levin, Tobacco Wins First In Series Of Secondhand Smoke Suits, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2001, at C3; see also Terri Somers, Jury Clears Big Tobacco, FORT LAUDERDALE
SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2001, at Al.
199 The trial court's initial jury instruction made it clear that "there is a rebuttable
presumption that exposure to secondhand smoke, or environmental tobacco smoke, is
harmful to one's health and can cause chronic bronchitis, emphysema, chronic sinusitis
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in healthy nonsmokers," but "it is the
plaintiff's burden to prove that, 1, she has one of the diseases enumerated above or an
aggravation of an existing condition and, 2, that her exposure to secondhand smoke was
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The plaintiffs counsel were apparently unable to persuade the jury
that ETS was the specific cause of one of the diseases named in the Broin
settlement and that her sarcoidosis was exacerbated by that disease. This
was no doubt attributable to the fact that the plaintiff's treating physician's
original diagnosis had not included one of the settlement diseases and the
fact that the defendant's expert testified that the plaintiff did not suffer
from any of those diseases. 200 Juror Melvin Raul Galeano, in post-trial
comments to the press, related that "[w]e just agreed that there was not
enough evidence to swing us to her favor." 201 He also complained that the
only testimony that the plaintiffs elicited from a treating physician came as
a rebuttal to a chorus of defense witnesses. 2
0 2
Finally, although the plaintiffs counsel in Fontana did introduce
limited evidence of the tobacco companies' knowledge of the harmful
effects of ETS, the defendants' culpability was not a major focus of the
trial because the plaintiff adhered to the position taken by all of the other
plaintiffs that they were not required to put on evidence of culpability.
The plaintiff, therefore, did not produce anything of the caliber of the
"smoking gun" memos that characterized the plaintiffs' well-publicized
victory in the same court in the Engel direct smoking trial.20 3
Because of the opening that it provided for the defense counsel to
focus the jury's attention on the fact that the plaintiff's primary life-
threatening disease was not associated with smoking, the Fontana case is
probably not a good case for testing the viability of a burden-shifting
device as a tool for punishing culpable conduct on the part of companies
who subject the public to environmental risks. Whether the Broin
settlement claims will provide a crucible for testing the workability of a
general causation presumption may also depend upon the outcome of the
the specific cause of the disease or aggravation claimed by her." Record at 400, Fontana
(Civ. No. 00-01731CA (09)). At the end of the trial, the court instructed the jury "as a
matter of law," that ETS "does cause chronic bronchitis, emphysema and/or chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD") in health nonsmokers." Id. at 3077.
200 Id. at 2388-2424.
201 Somers, supra note 198, at Al.
202 One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs explained that they did not call the primary
treating physician because he had not included chronic obstructive pulmonary disease as
one of the plaintiff's afflictions in his original report, and the plaintiff's attorneys did not
want to risk embarrassing one of their own witnesses. Fontana v. Philip Morris Cos., Civ.
No. 00-01731CA (09) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 19, 2001).
203 See Maya Bell, $145 Billion: Tobacco Giants Get Burned, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July
15, 2000, at Al; see also Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record
Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al.
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appeal. If counsel for the remaining three thousand flight attendants must
prove negligence and proximate causation, as well as rebut the defendants'
proof on cause-in-fact, then the trials may take considerably longer than
three weeks to reach completion, and each individual case will consume
considerably greater resources.
Even if the plaintiffs prevail in the appeal, several potential problems
remain with the Broin presumption-rebuttal approach. First, like Professor
Berger's approach, the Broin settlement approach begs the question of the
range of diseases to which it is applicable. In Broin, the settlement itself
defined the scope of its applicability. The list of compensible diseases
grew out of a very lengthy trial in which a great deal of expert evidence
was presented about the diseases potentially caused by ETS exposure.
This solution, however, probably cannot be extrapolated to all toxic torts.
Unless the regime is willing to allow any exposed plaintiff who complains
of any disease to shift the burden of proving general causation to the
defendant, then some entity will have to determine which diseases do raise
the presumption. This is by no means an insurmountable difficulty, but it
must be addressed in any regime that cannot depend upon the parties
themselves to decide which diseases are in this sense "compensible."
Second, the absence of punitive damages as a lure to plaintiffs'
attorneys may stand in the way of the Broin settlement approach as a
general solution to the causation problem in toxic torts cases. The seven
law firms that have agreed to represent the more than 3000 flight
attendants in the litigation provided for in the Broin settlement are
apparently prepared to put on hundreds of cases on specific causation in an
assembly-line fashion. The hope is, however, that once a large enough
number of cases are decided in favor of plaintiffs, the defendants will be
willing to settle the remaining cases on terms acceptable to the law firms
and the remaining plaintiffs. Given a guaranteed flow of cases with a high
probability of success, the assembly line approach may provide a sufficient
inducement for attorneys to put resources into trials without the hope of
receiving punitive damage awards. The prospect of punitive damages may
be necessary in more run-of-the-mill situations to attract plaintiffs'
attorneys.
Finally, the Broin settlement, as currently interpreted by the district
judge, assigns a very small role, if any, to the defendant's culpability. The
defendants' misconduct was presumably one of the reasons that the
original attorneys for the Broin class plaintiffs were able to extract
concessions from the defendants during the settlement negotiations. If the
plaintiffs prevail on appeal, then the coupling of culpability with causation
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will have occurred during the settlement process. Culpability may have to
play a larger and more clearly defined role in a more general tort regime
that does not grow out of a particular settlement.
3. The Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group Proposal
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") created a Study Group to examine
alternative reparations regimes for compensating victims of hazardous
wastes. 20 4 The Study Group, which was composed of law professors and
attorneys from the plaintiff and defense bars, recommended that Congress
enact legislation establishing a two-tiered system for compensating
persons injured by exposure to hazardous wastes. 20 Modeled on many
state workers' compensation regimes, the first tier would be administered
by a federal agency and would provide rapid reimbursement of medical
expenses and limited compensation ($2000 per month cap) for loss of
earnings. Plaintiffs could elect, however, to pursue the second tier, which
would consist of a common law trial under slightly modified procedural
rules.
The Study Group's Tier One compensation regime would be
managed by a federal agency created by Congress and funded through a
special tax on petroleum and the generation of hazardous wastes. 20 6 It
would compensate persons who suffered injury due to non-occupational
exposure to hazardous wastes for their medical expenses and provide
limited compensation for loss of earnings. In order to be entitled to
recovery, a claimant would have to show that he or she was exposed to a
hazardous waste that was known to cause injuiy, that the plaintiff suffered
disease or injury of the sort that the hazardous waste was known to cause,
and that the exposure caused the disease or injury. In this regard, the
claimant could refer to a "toxic substances document" prepared by a
federal agency and based upon "scientific data," including information on
particular hazardous wastes or substances accumulated during the
"exercise of agency responsibilities" and "evidence collected in connection
with past or pending cases.' 20 7 A claimant who showed that he or she had
204 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (2001).
205 See CERCLA SECTION 30 1(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 170.
206 !d. at 207.
207 Id. at 176-77. Toxic substances documents would be prepared by a suitable federal
agency and published in the Federal Register, along with supporting documents and
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been exposed to a hazardous waste would be entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that an injury or disease was caused by that exposure if,
according to a "toxic substances document," the injury or disease was
"known to result" from exposure to that hazardous waste.
208
A claimant could, however, opt out of the Tier One administrative
regime and pursue a Tier Two claim in court under relaxed procedural
rules governing the time of accrual of actions, joinder of parties,
apportionment, and proof of causation. 209 The Study Group stopped short,
however, of recommending that state courts apply the causation
presumption based upon agency-prepared "toxic substances
documents., 210 A majority of the Study Group concluded that while such
a presumption would be warranted in an administrative regime in which
speedy decisionmaking was important and in which damages were limited,
it should not be extended to ordinary tort litigation.211 Some members
feared that requiring such a presumption in plenary tort actions would
encourage claimants to forego the administrative regime in favor of the
potentially larger final award in the tort action. 212 At the same time, the
Study Group concluded that the "toxic substance documents" might be
freely introduced as evidence in Tier Two jury trials in the same manner as
learned treatises and other authoritative works without giving rise to a
rebuttable presumption.
The Superfund Study Group's recommendations go a long way
toward solving the scope of applicability problem by assigning that role to
a federal agency. The agency-prepared "toxic substances document"
would identify those diseases with which exposures to a particular toxic
substance were associated. Claimants in the Tier One administrative
regime would then benefit from a presumption of general causation for the
diseases identified in the documents. The proposal is quite vague,
however, on the role that the defendant's culpability would play in the Tier
One compensation regime. Apparently, the plaintiff would be required
only to prove that the defendant contributed to the hazardous waste to
which the plaintiff was exposed in order to enter the Tier One process.
references to published scientific studies, and the agency would consider public
comments prior to finalizing the documents. Id.
208 See id. at 176, 179. Either the claimant or the fund could obtain judicial review of the
compensation award. See id. at 214.
209 Id. at 217.
210 Id. at 225.
211 CERCLA SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 170, at 226.
212 Id.
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While it may be socially desirable to hold disposers of hazardous wastes
strictly liable, that policy may not apply in other toxic tort contexts. In
addition, by limiting Tier One claimants' compensation to medical
expenses and lost wages the regime has the great disadvantage of
rendering typical cases unattractive to plaintiffs' attorneys. A plaintiff
could opt into the Tier Two common law regime, but would no longer be
able to invoke a presumption based upon the "toxic substances document."
B. A Proposal for a Mixed Regime
The Superfund Study Group's proposal has the considerable
advantage of assigning a powerful role in determining general causation to
an independent federal agency with expertise in assessing the human
health risks posed by toxic substances in the environment. It offers the
possibility of developing "new institutional arrangements that adapt the
best features of both courts and the administrative process to deal with the
problems of toxics in the environment. 213  I would like to carry that
proposal a step farther to suggest a common law-like reparations regime
that assigns an important scientific assessment role to a federal agency and
an equally important moral assessment role to the jury. The toxic tort
regime described below would explicitly allow juries to commingle
culpability and causation, but would confine its role (and that of the trial
judge) as a factfinder on the question of general causation to one that
better fits lay decision makers.
The starting point in my proposal is a formal hazard assessment
document prepared by a federal agency.214 This suggestion reflects the
understanding of the Superfund Study Group and other scholars that
federal agencies have a great deal to offer the common law courts by way
of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of scientific information for
213 E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a
Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 HOuS. L. REV. 781, 783
(1988). Professor Elliott recognized early on that common law courts may not be the
most appropriate institution to resolve the complex and uncertainty-dominated
science/policy questions that are at the heart of the cause-in-fact question in toxic tort
litigation. See also Elliott, supra note 11.
214 There is no reason in theory why the risk assessor could not be a state agency. Since
the proposal is offered as a solution to a problem caused largely by the federal judiciary's
overly aggressive application of a federal rule of evidence, the institution will probably
need to be federal in nature.
2001]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
policy relevant purposes.215 The federal agency charged with the hazard
assessment task could be the EPA, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, the Centers for Disease Control, the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR"), or some other agency
designated for this purpose.216 The task must, however, be assigned to a
single entity to avoid the possibility of "dueling assessments." In order to
lend the necessary degree of legitimacy to the hazard assessment
enterprise, it should be open to the public. The agency would maintain an
administrative record containing scientific studies, comments on those
studies by interested persons, and the minutes of any meetings between the
relevant agency personnel and outsiders. The agency could empanel
scientific advisory committees, elicit the views of "peer reviewers," and
make inquiries of companies and scientists who had conducted relevant
studies. The final hazard assessment document would be subject to
judicial review in a court of appeals under the Administrative Procedure
Act's familiar "arbitrary and capricious" test.21 7
The agency would be required to evaluate existing scientific
information on the hazard posed by the substance at issue using a "weight-
of-the-evidence" evaluation of that information. The agency could
determine that a study was so poorly conducted that it was entitled to no
weight at all, or it could consider flawed studies to the extent that they
provided support for conclusions suggested by better designed and
executed studies. The agency would, of course, be allowed to consider
animal studies to the extent that they were appropriately conducted and
were scientifically relevant. The agency would be asked to assign the
substance to one of four categories based upon its evaluation of the weight
of the evidence. Depending upon the strength of association that the
agency found between exposure to the substance and disease, the agency
document would have a predetermined procedural effect on the jury's
deliberations after an initial jury finding on the issue of the defendant's
culpability.
1. The Culpability Determination
215 See Elliott, supra note 38, at 505-07; see also Elliott, supra note 11, at 1358-60.
216 Professors Elliott and Brennan have expressed some confidence in ATSDR as a risk
evaluator. Brennan, supra note 43, at 50; Elliott, supra note 213, at 799.
217 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
[Vol. 26:1
LINKING CULPABILITY AND CAUSATION
Like the administrative agency's hazard assessment, the defendant's
culpability would play a carefully defined role in determining liability.
Given the potentially enormous stakes involved, proof that the defendant
was evil in some regard would not be enough to provide a procedural
advantage to the plaintiff. The culpability would have to be causally tied
to the alleged injury in the broad sense that the defendant's culpable
conduct played a role in the plaintiff's exposure to the defendant's agent.
For purposes of the mixed regime suggested here, "culpability" would
consist of: (1) a significant violation by the defendant of existing state or
federal regulatory requirements governing the sale, distribution, use or
disposal of the agent; (2) a serious attempt to manipulate inappropriately a
state or federal agency risk assessment or standard setting process
applicable to the agent;2 18 or (3) a successful attempt to mislead at-risk
members of the public (including the plaintiff) with respect to the nature
and magnitude of the risk posed by the agent. Attorneys for plaintiffs
would have full discovery rights for the purpose of ascertaining
culpability. Following the culpability determination, the jury would make
general and specific causation determinations in accordance with the
following procedural approach.
2. No Association Between Exposure and Plaintiff's Disease
For cases in which the administrative assessment found no
association between exposure to the defendant's agent and a disease of the
sort suffered by the plaintiff, the plaintiff would take nothing, no matter
how culpable the jury believed the defendant's conduct to be. This would
be the case for substances in which the agency found no association
between exposure to the defendant's substance and any disease and in
situations in which the jury found that the plaintiff did not suffer from one
of the diseases for which the agency found an association. The former
situation would be an appropriate occasion for granting a defendant's
motion of summary judgment. For example, silicone gel breast implants
could well wind up in this category. Even though much evidence exists of
gross misconduct on the part of the manufacturers, the relevant agency
could determine that the weight of the scientific evidence does not indicate
218 This would include funding bogus science, screening and hiding negative studies, and
stopping ongoing studies when they appeared to be going the wrong way. For this
purpose, the "regulatory process" should be viewed broadly to include attempts to
manipulate White House or congressional personnel with false or misleading data or other
information in an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the relevant administrators.
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even a weak association between implants and connective tissue
disorders.2 1 9 If so, then plaintiffs would receive no compensation, and any
punishment for culpable conduct would have to come directly at the hands
of the government.
220
3. Weak Association Between Exposure and Plaintiff's Disease
A conclusion in the hazard assessment documents that the weight of
the evidence demonstrated a "weak" association between exposure to the
substance at issue and the plaintiffs disease would give the plaintiff a
modest procedural advantage in the jury trial. Although opinions might
vary about what kinds of evidence should support a conclusion of a
"weak" association, I would suggest that it could be based upon: (1)
multiple animal studies supported by pharmacodynamics studies
demonstrating the relevance of the tested species to the human exposures;
(2) a single well-conducted epidemiological study or meta-analysis of
multiple studies demonstrating a relative risk of 1.4 or greater; or (3) a
combination of animal studies and one or more epidemiological studies
demonstrating a relative risk of 1.3 or greater.
Although others might suggest different criteria for the "weak"
association category, the defining criteria outlined above appear consistent
with general practice. For example, EPA concluded that ETS was a Group
A human carcinogen based upon a meta-analysis of epidemiological
studies demonstrating a relative risk of approximately 1.42 for lung
cancer.22 1 According to EPA's criteria, a Group A classification "is used
only when there is sufficient evidence from epidemiologic studies to
support a causal association between exposure to the agents and
cancer.' 222 EPA's guidelines allow the agency to conclude that a chemical
is a "Group B-Probable Human Carcinogen" on the basis of "limited"
epidemiological data combined with "sufficient" animal studies
demonstrating evidence of carcinogenicity. 223
219 See Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1146-47.
220 At this point, no punishment has been meted out to the manufacturers of silicone gel
breast implants, but the FDA has imposed a moratorium on their sale, and they are no
longer being produced. See id. at 1140.
221 See FINAL EPA ETS REPORT, supra note 95, at 5-2.
222 See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 (Apr.
23, 1996).
223 Id.
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When the agency report concluded that a "weak" association existed
between exposure and the plaintiff's disease, the jury would be permitted
to make a finding of general causation without any additional evidence,
but there would be no presumption in favor of a general causation finding.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant could introduce Daubert-reliable
expert testimony on the issue of general causation, but the plaintiff would
not be required to present Daubert-reliable expert testimony on that issue
and could instead rely upon the report.
If the plaintiff proved to the jury's satisfaction that the defendant was
culpable, however, a presumption would arise that the substance was
capable of causing the plaintiffs disease. The plaintiff would prevail on
the general causation issue unless the defendant proved with Daubert-
reliable expert testimony that the substance was incapable of causing the
disease. In either case, a plaintiff prevailing on the general causation issue
would have the burden of proving specific causation through direct
testimony and, if necessary, through Daubert-reliable expert testimony.
As previously discussed, this would require at least a showing that the
plaintiff received a sufficient exposure to cause the plaintiff's disease.
4. Strong Association Between Exposure and Disease
If the agency's report concluded that a "strong" association existed
between exposure to the substance and the plaintiffs disease, the plaintiff
would benefit from more powerful presumptions. A strong association
could be established by a single epidemiological study deemed adequate to
the agency demonstrating a relative risk of 2.0 or greater or a well
conducted epidemiological study demonstrating a relative risk of 1.5 or
greater with more than one supporting animal study. Although a relative
risk of less than 2.0 does not, standing alone, indicate that the exposure
was "more likely than not" the cause of the disease, a relative risk of 1.5-
2.0 is nevertheless a stronger association than required by EPA to classify
a chemical as a Group A carcinogen. When combined with confirming
animal studies such a strong association is usually enough to persuade
regulatory agencies to take action to protect the public, even though other
agents, activities, or even genetic makeup may also be a cause of the
observed disease. 22
4
224 See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (EPA list of
high risk hazardous air pollutants); see also Int'l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (drinking water standards for perchloroethylene); Int'l Union, United
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In cases in which the administrative hazard assessment found a
strong association between exposure and the plaintiffs disease, the report
itself would give rise to a presumption in favor of general causation
without proof of culpability. Proof of culpability would raise an additional
presumption that the defendant's agent was the specific cause of the
plaintiffs disease. The defendant could rebut both presumptions by
proving to the jury with Daubert-reliable expert witnesses that the
plaintiff's disease was probably not caused by exposure to the defendant's
agent. The defendant could also prevail if it proved to the jury that some
other agent was more likely than not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
disease.
5. Dominant Among Multiple Causes
Occasionally the epidemiological data demonstrates a statistical
association so powerful that the exposure to the toxic substance appears to
be the dominant cause among many possible causes of the disease. Such
strong associations occur more frequently in the context of rare diseases,
because the denominator in the relative risk ratio (representing the
incidence in the unexposed population) is already quite small. Although a
single study demonstrating a relative risk of 2.0 suggests that any given
individual incidence in the exposed population was probably caused by the
exposure to the defendant's agent, multiple epidemiological studies
demonstrating a relative risk of greater than 2.0 should be required to
demonstrate that the defendant's agent was the dominant among multiple
causes. A single epidemiological study demonstrating a relative risk of 3.0
or greater when supported by well-conducted animal studies should also
suffice.
In such cases, the administrative report would give rise to a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the plaintiff on both general and
specific causation without proof of culpability. The defendant would be
permitted to rebut the presumption by attacking the validity of the
agency's conclusions, with Daubert-reliable expert testimony. If the
defendant's proof undermined the agency's conclusions and the jury
concluded that the defendant's agent was probably not the cause of the
plaintiffs disease, the defendant would escape liability. Proof of
culpability would, however, prevent the defendant from pointing to other
possible causes of the plaintiffs affliction in an effort to rebut the
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Pendergrass, 878
F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (regulation of formaldehyde based on animal studies).
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presumption. If a culpable defendant's agent is statistically the dominant
among multiple causes, then the mere possibility that something else
might have caused the plaintiffs disease should not relieve the defendant
of liability.
C. The Virtues of Coupling Culpability with Causation
The combined approach outlined above should improve the existing
common law regime in several important regards. First, it should provide
adequate compensation for persons who are harmed by exposure to toxic
agents and who would otherwise have to rely upon their own or collective
societal resources. Because culpability should play a powerful role in
liability determinations, certainly a more direct role than it plays in much
current products liability litigation, the shift in resources should come
primarily at the expense of defendants who cannot claim to be innocent
victims of an out-of-control litigation machine.
Second, by assigning the primary hazard assessment role to an
administrative agency, the proposal provides a better match between
assigned institutional roles and institutional competence than the current
regime. A presumably objective administrative agency with expertise in
epidemiology and toxicology will play a prominent role in assessing the
validity of scientific studies and in drawing scientific conclusions.
Although administrative agencies may be somewhat more susceptible to
the prevailing political winds than a judge or a jury, they can bring
expertise to bear on complex science-policy questions in a way that is
generally credible and therefore acceptable to the general public.
225
Making a single hazard assessment available for all lawsuits involving the
same toxic agent should enhance litigative efficiency. At the same time,
the proposal divests trial judges of the wholly inappropriate scientific
226gatekeeper role that Daubert/Joiner has forced them to play. The
appellate judiciary would still play a modest role of ensuring the
rationality of the agency's hazard assessment process when it reviews the
administrative hazard assessments under the "arbitrary and capricious"
test.227 The trial and appellate judges in individual cases would not,
however, be permitted to nit-pick the scientific evidence under the
corpuscular approach followed by many current courts.
225 Elliott, supra note 213.
226 See Berger, supra note 7, at 2122.
227 See Elliott, supra note 11, at 1374.
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Third, the proposal would assign a prominent role to the jury in the
decision-making process while recognizing that lay juries need expert help
in resolving difficult science-policy issues. The Daubert Court's implicit
conclusion that the jury cannot be trusted to separate junk science from the
real thing may well be correct. The courts have, however, applied Daubert
aggressively to divest the jury of a critical decisionmaking role in toxic tort
litigation, an outcome that is not easy to square with the plaintiff's Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.228 Although my proposal
does not make the jury the exclusive factfinder, it allows the jury to
determine whether the presumption of causation has been rebutted, a task
for which it is better suited than that of evaluating the scientific data and
inferences in the first instance. Moreover, my proposal will assign to the
jury the critical role of determining culpability, a role for which the jury is
especially well-suited.229 With the aid of an agency's hazard assessment
report, appropriate presumptions, and competent expert testimony, juries
can be trusted to evaluate technically difficult information.230
Fourth, the strong incentive that the proposal provides to plaintiffs to
prove culpability should help smoke out more evidence of corporate
malfeasance than the existing federal administrative process. One of the
considerable advantages of a tort reparations regime is its capacity to get to
the truth of the matter in ways that are largely unavailable to regulatory
agencies engaged in traditional rule-making and enforcement. 231
Regulatory agencies ordinarily do not have a strong interest in culpability
per se, because their primary goal is to get dangerous products off the
market and dangerous contaminants out of the environment as quickly as
possible, regardless of who is at fault. Private attorneys, by contrast, are
adept at uncovering evidence of culpability in the discovery that precedes
common law trials, and they are willing to spend the resources necessary
to copy and organize documents, take depositions, and fight the company's
228 See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 759.
229 See Berger, supra note 7, at 2151 (arguing that "decisions about whether particular
behavior warrants liability" are "well-suited to the jury's role as a representative of the
community").
230 See Christopher H. Buckley, Jr., Toxic Tort Cases: Risk Assessment and Junk Science,
9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 499 (2000) (concluding that "juries understand good
science even if it is complicated").
231 See Berger, supra note 7, at 2150 (citing case studies that "amply demonstrate the
legal system's ability to ferret out the 'smoking guns' that would establish negligence").
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efforts to resist discovery. 232 The tobacco litigation has underscored the
value of document discovery and compelled testimony under oath, and my
proposal takes full advantage of that potential.
Fifth, by focusing the culpability inquiry at least partially on attempts
to manipulate the regulatory process, the tort regime should complement
the regulatory regime by indirectly enhancing its integrity. The
culpability-based presumptions should send a message to regulated entities
that quiet attempts to manipulate the regulatory programs will probably be
uncovered if something goes wrong and someone is injured. The tort
regime should therefore discourage manipulation and deceit in interactions
between regulators and regulatees. If culpability is defined more broadly
to include fraudulent or misleading manipulation of public perceptions, the
approach suggested here will also encourage truthfulness in advertising
and public relations initiatives. Similarly, by making substantial
noncompliance with state and federal regulations a basis for a culpability
finding, my proposal should encourage compliance with those regulations.
Finally, the knowledge that a federal agency will evaluate all of the
available information in assessing the hazards posed by a chemical should
enhance the incentive of the manufacturer to conduct adequate testing. At
the very least it should take away the "perverse disincentive" that the
current post-Daubert law provides to forego testing altogether. 233
D. Objections to the Proposal
There are, of course, legitimate reasons for objecting to the proposal
outlined above. First, some will no doubt argue that it assigns too large a
role to a remote federal bureaucracy. Many potential defendants are also
regulatees and have therefore interacted on a regular basis with federal
regulatory agencies. Depending upon the nature of that interaction, they
may not be inclined to place much faith in federal bureaucrats to come up
with fair and accurate hazard assessments. One answer to this objection is
that the proposal allows affected companies to participate vigorously in the
232 See GREEN, supra note 21, at 15 (detailing how attorneys for plaintiffs in asbestos
information obtained information on wrongdoing); Nagareda, supra note 44, at 923
(reporting that plaintiffs' attorneys in the breast implant litigation "invested several
million dollars toward the collection and organization of documents bearing upon the
defendant manufacturers' knowledge of potential product risks").
233 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1090.
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hazard assessment process and thereby attempt to affect its outcome.2 34
Another answer may be to assign the task to an agency that can command
the trust of most affected parties or to create such an agency.
Second, the combined administrative-common law regime suggested
here may exacerbate an unavoidable timing issue. One important aspect of
toxic tort claims is the typically long latency period between the exposure
to the toxic substance and the manifestation of a disease caused by that
exposure.235 At any given time, some victims may have contracted a
disease associated with exposure while others have been put at risk for
contracting diseases at some point in the future.236 Plaintiffs' attorneys
have typically attempted to address this problem by including both past
and potential victims in a single lawsuit and structuring the damage award
so that past victims are compensated immediately and future victims are
compensated through a quasi-administrative arrangement.237 Although not
necessarily inconsistent with an omnibus remedy that resolves present and
future liability, the approach suggested here encourages the agency to
amend the hazard assessment as more knowledge becomes available. If
the revised hazard assessment indicated that the association was stronger
or weaker than previously determined, the presumptions could be adjusted
accordingly for application in future cases. Although it would not affect
pre-existing remedies, this possibility might discourage parties from
entering into omnibus settlements that resolve present and future
liabilities. Whether the increased accuracy of a regime that changes with
changing information is preferable to the increased efficiency of a regime
that encourages omnibus remedies is admittedly a question about which
reasonable minds may differ. In my view, it is unlikely that parties will be
motivated to enter into large omnibus settlements until the available
scientific information is sufficiently robust that the probability of a
significant modification of any risk assessment is fairly low.
Third, one may raise legitimate policy concerns about a reparations
regime that encourages juries to commingle culpability with causation.
234 The tobacco industry participated exceedingly vigorously in EPA's attempt to assess
the risks posed to nonsmokers by environmental tobacco smoke, and they successfully
challenged the risk assessment in district court. See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.
Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
235 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1787 ("Mass torts characteristically involve injury in
the form of disease for which there is a substantial gap in time between exposure to the
product in question and the onset of impairment.").
3 See id. at 1786-87.
237 See id. at 1782, 1785, 1787-88, 1798.
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Professor Nagareda, for example, suggests that jurors who commingle
culpability with -causation "are, putting into effect their moral intuitions
through channels wildly unsuited to their implicit goal."238  Under the
United States Constitution, criminal sanctions are not to be lightly
imposed by the state, and the law of criminal procedure provides many
protections to criminal defendants that are unavailable in common law tort
regimes. 239 The typical "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof
and the burden shifting devices suggested above place an unaccustomed
burden of proof on the defendant (though not on the question of
"innocence"). Nevertheless, the American legal system has until now
tolerated considerable intrusion by civil law into territories that are
ordinarily within the domain of the criminal law. The state itself may
punish unlawful conduct through civil penalties that are equally
burdensome to the pocketbook without proving the facts beyond a
reasonable doubt and without protections against compelled self-
inculpating testimony.240 And the harshest penalty that the tort law can
inflict against a corporation, bankruptcy, is so frequently invoked these
days by tort defendants as a strategic tool that none of the stigma of
criminal liability attaches to that result.
241
Finally, many fear that a reparations system that permits
commingling of culpability with causation will allow plaintiffs to file
undeserving claims against defendants that did not cause any harm based
solely upon an uninformed "sense of moral outrage." 242  For many
observers, "corrective justice" should be the primary goal of a tort
regime,243 and a fundamental requirement of corrective' justice is that the
entity that the law requires to adjust its position for the benefit of some
238 Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1174.
239 The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and protections against double jeopardy are just a few of the procedural
protections that are available to defendants when the state attempts to assign blame
through the criminal law.
240 See U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
241 In this regard, I am inclined to disagree with Professor Nagareda's assessment of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a stigma-providing substitute for the criminal law. See
Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1146-47.
242 Id. at 1126.
243 According to the theory of "corrective justice," the primary purpose of tort law is to
place two parties in the same position they were in prior to some unlawful "transaction."
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 43, at 1189-90.
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other person has caused loss to the other person.2 " Professor Schroeder,
however, persuasively argues that allowing persons placed at risk to
recover from risk-producing entities without proving that the activity
caused a particular injury is consistent with corrective justice because it
provides ex ante incentives to potential risk producers to take the interests
of potential victims into account at the time they take risk-producing
action and compensates to some degree those persons put at risk.245
However one resolves the debate over corrective justice and risk-
based compensation, the proposal outlined above has a much lower
potential to violate corrective justice principles. First, it does not abandon
cause-in-fact altogether; it is merely willing to accept proof of general
causation on the basis of statistical evidence short of 50-50 probability in
cases involving culpable defendants. Second, since only a culpable
defendant can be held liable on proof of less than 50-50 probability, the
primary injustice inherent in the regime is its potential to punish
wrongdoers by way of providing windfalls for undeserving plaintiffs.
Professor Nagareda notes that "the conventional conception of tort law
offers no justification for the compelled transfer of money to [an
unharmed] individual, no matter how much good one might produce in the
future by so doing." 246 One justification, however, may be that since the
regulatory regime is incapable of punishing many such wrongdoers, a
modest change in the tort regime may be warranted in the interests of
general deterrence and, perhaps more importantly, to fill a legitimate
societal need for retribution and closure.247
IV. CONCLUSIONS
244 Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990). For other thoughtful arguments in support of liability for
increased risk, see Glen 0. Robinson & Donald D. Elliott, Probabilistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 783-99 (1985); David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984).
245 Schroeder, supra note 244, at 465-66.
246 Nagareda, supra note 41, at 1176.
247 Plaintiffs' lawyers in toxic tort litigation soon discover, sometimes to their dismay,
that for their clients the lawsuit is not so much about the money as it is about the desire to
force a callous company to acknowledge and/or pay for its wrongdoing in the absence of
any effective government-imposed sanctions. See HAAR, supra note 14.
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Responding to the chemical industry's resistance to a victim
compensation measure that he had hoped to include in a pending
Superfund Reauthorization bill, Rep. James Florio warned in 1984 that the
lax environmental policies of the Reagan Administration would "produce
a backlash" that would soon change the industry's mind.248 The backlash
did in fact occur, 249 but the industry has never supported an administrative
compensation regime of the sort that Rep. Florio proposed. Perhaps for
that reason, Congress has rejected suggestions for such administrative
regimes in all but a few limited contexts.250 The coming accountability
crisis should offer new opportunities for advocates of past and future
victims of modem technologies to persuade Congress to enact
fundamental changes in the way that courts go about determining liability
for harm inflicted by poorly regulated toxic agents. The next round of
hearings on "tort reform" should at the very least examine the legitimacy
of the Supreme Court's assignment of a scientific gatekeeping role to
marginally qualified trial judges, and the next round of proposed tort
reform legislation should include proposals for combining culpability with
causation in a mixed administrative/common law tort regime.
248 Chemical Industry Ultimately Will Request Victim Compensation System, Florio
Predicts, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 575, 575-76 (1984) (quoting Rep. James J. Florio (D-
NJ)).
249 See, e.g., JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984).
250 See Brinker, supra note 42, at 1324.
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